In a recent article for Forbes, perennial critic of private contractors, P.W. Singer, launches another broadside at the industry (just as Jeremy Scahill re-releases his exposé of the industry and, in particular, Blackwater). And unfortunately for the industry, as has been pointed out time and time again, “the big lie” gets a whole lot more airtime than “the big truth.” Hence, it is ironic that Mr. Singer would begin his latest piece with “Conspiracy theories aside…”Admittedly, there is much about this industry that, on paper, gives its critics plenty of ammunition to attack. The truth often sits just below the surface, but rarely is there much digging to get to that truth. Numbers are particularly popular in disc ourse about this industry: $150 billion in contracts; 180,000 contractors in Iraq; $10 billion missing and unaccounted for.
These numbers sound large and clearly serious enough to fuel book sales or justify research grants. But if these numbers are seriously examined the picture becomes a little more … well, boring.
If I were to purchase a plane ticket back home to Australia, it could cost me upwards of $2,000. Multiply that by 300 passengers on a plane in coach and that comes to $600,000. Add in first and business class passengers and freight and we’re getting close to a million dollars a flight. Times that by, say, 10 flights a week, and we’re approaching half a billion dollars a year, just for one route. These airlines are clearly making out like bandits.
But wait – those planes cost millions of dollars to buy. And fuel is expensive nowadays. Plus, you’ve got to pay the pilots and the flight attendants, not to mention the engineers, mechanics, ground staff, caterers, reservation agents and managers. Plus, there are air traffic control fees, landing fees, taxes… the list goes on. So in reality, the amount of profit an airline may make is likely to be marginal, if at all. The same is true for private contractors. $150 billion sounds like a lot of money. But it is not $150 billion in profit. It is simply how much the military has spent over a decade in procuring logistical services to support the largest military on earth. Plus, it may have cost the military more to provide those services itself.
By no means should $150 billion of tax-payers money be understated or trivialized. Mr. Singer writes that Congress has identified “$10 billion in unsupported or questionable costs from battlefield contractors.” Of course this is bad and should be thoroughly investigated. But, the reality is that this money is not being spent at a department store with receipts and a return policy. When dealing with nascent local Iraqi firms, proper documentation often isn’t an option. Plus, when operating in the chaos of a warzone, sometimes invoices and receipts may be misplaced. Essentially, we are dropping a highly organized and rigorous administrative system into a blender and adding conflict, weak institutions and medieval accounting systems and expecting a perfect result. And with the rapid turnover of government staff charged with contract oversight, losing track of these figures is hardly outside the realm of possibility. Unacceptable? Yes. Malevolent? No. Sometimes things don’t add up; but it doesn’t mean that there is a grand conspiracy behind it all.
Another common number that crops up when talking about private contractors is the number of them operating in Iraq. It has been said often that there are 180,000 contractors in Iraq. Of course, the Scahill approach is to say that there are 180,000 contractors in Iraq, some contractors provide security, some of it armed, some of it provided by Blackwater, some employees of which are American, therefore implying that there are 180,000 heavily-armed American Blackwater operatives patrolling the streets of Baghdad.
Regardless of how many contractors are in Iraq, it must be noted that the vast majority of these are local Iraqis engaged generally in logistics and engineering tasks. Indeed, many estimates point to there being less than 50,000 non-Iraqi contractors, many of whom are from developing countries such as Bangladesh, India or Uganda and remarkably few who are westerners, let alone Americans. The money paid to these Iraqi contractors is feeding back into the Iraqi economy and is expanding skilled capacity within the Iraqi workforce.
Private contractors are not policy or decision makers. Contractors are not proxies for U.S. policies. Contractors are providing valuable services, not least in the reconstruction of Iraq’s shattered society. Post-conflict accounting can be as ugly as the conflict itself. Though tax-payers should demand accountability in the spending of their money – and an expectation that the authorities go after corruption and fraud wherever it is found – there should equally be the realization that rebuilding an entire nation is neither cheap nor tidy.
An Article By JJ Messner, from the Latest Edition of the Journal Of International Peace Operations
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