By Steve Collins MCIoJ MSyI ILEETA CEO of PS5
It hasn’t worked, and I always said it wouldn’t.
It is now on record that the £12 million of tax payer’s money this Government has poured into fighting knife crime has been an utter waste.Those that know me will verify that I have been very vocal about so-called 'Government strategies' being a complete waste of time and public money.
When are the people that decide on these policies going to recognise that the only ones who really understand knife crime on the streets of Britain are the people that commit it? Furthermore, the vast majority of these people have no interest whatsoever in what the law says about knives, and even less regarding what spews out of 10 Downing Street. What's more, the mainstream of those who would like to get rid of their knives are unlikely to do so because they believe being unarmed in a war zone is stupid in the extreme.
In the past ten years violent crime has been allowed to grow by 77% in the UK. According to various statistics, this is higher than for any other country in Europe. At present, violent crime accounts for more than 1.15 million of the total crimes committed in the UK each year. Having to live in a country that is not only under the ever present threat of terrorism, but also has more than 70 reported knife attacks every day and we all could be forgiven for feeling a little under threat.
Over the past few weeks, at the cost of millions, every household in the UK has been mailed with a 12-page leaflet on how to protect yourself and your loved ones against Swine Flu.
You can obtain this information in about 15 different languages, on audio tape, in extra large print and even in Braille.
Please let me pose a very simple question... Where is the 12-page leaflet that tells you how to protect yourself against an epidemic of weapons-related street crime that has been allowed to grow into a colossal malignant cancer already responsible for destroying thousands of lives?
We should be mortally embarrassed that, in the 21st Century, the British people have allowed the horrendous decline in values and discipline to ravage our streets and terrorise our citizens.
I make no apologies for sounding like a broken record, but it’s a no-brainer...If you want to cut knife crime then educate the victims.
It’s the victims who pick up the tab for the Government getting it wrong. It’s the victims that suffer in silence while huge amounts of Government resources are being poured into futile initiatives that just don’t work.
We are all victims of violent crime and, as such, every citizen in this country should have access to information that helps them to understand the threat and gives them options on what they can do to avoid and survive it.
I wonder how much the British tax payer has paid for these pearls of wisdom printed it the Swine Flu leaflet.
'Catch It, Kill It, Bin It',
Well here’s one for all of you on the subject of street crime. Accept this advice with my complements.
'Accept It, Avoid It, Survive It'.
• Complacency will steal your life - accept the fact that weapons-related street crime is now part of your life and will never go away
• Do everything in your power to stay away from the people and avoid the places that might endanger you
• Learn how to recognise the danger signs that always precede an attack - this will help you to survive, and remember that survival is all you can ever hope for
It's time to stop the talking and do something
It’s time to stop talking and take action. If the Government and the police won’t do it, I’ll do it and I’m willing to work together with like-minded people and organisations who believe my words to have merit to generate the funding and get on with the job. While the Government wastes more tax payer’s money, people are dying and lives are being destroyed for lack of information.
I have thrown down the gauntlet. Who will pick it up and work with me?
Showing posts with label Commentary. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Commentary. Show all posts
Saturday, 1 August 2009
Wednesday, 17 June 2009
Iranian Political Instability and the use of Twitter
There is much in the news currently about Iranian Political Instability and the use of Twitter.
There is no denying the phenomenal success and usefulness of Twitter – but it is used by anybody to write about anything. Anything at all!
There aren't many sophisticated ways to filter the increasing Twitter chatter, and the service can become a major time-suck – you can spend hours seeking Tweets that have any real relevance, interest or value.
Surely a system dedicated only to reaching a specific stakeholder / target audience – such as “security” - would better serve the purpose for the thousands of professionals who operate in it, or millions more who could reach out directly to experts for their professional advice and assistance - strategic and operational.
For example, a user generated information service for the “global community” to collaborate, SPECIFICALLY in preparation for and in response to incidents worldwide that threaten political, social, economic, humanitarian and environmental stability.
Or does such a system exist already? Is it even feasible – would /do people use it?
There is no denying the phenomenal success and usefulness of Twitter – but it is used by anybody to write about anything. Anything at all!
There aren't many sophisticated ways to filter the increasing Twitter chatter, and the service can become a major time-suck – you can spend hours seeking Tweets that have any real relevance, interest or value.
Surely a system dedicated only to reaching a specific stakeholder / target audience – such as “security” - would better serve the purpose for the thousands of professionals who operate in it, or millions more who could reach out directly to experts for their professional advice and assistance - strategic and operational.
For example, a user generated information service for the “global community” to collaborate, SPECIFICALLY in preparation for and in response to incidents worldwide that threaten political, social, economic, humanitarian and environmental stability.
Or does such a system exist already? Is it even feasible – would /do people use it?
Wednesday, 10 June 2009
Risks Of Aid Work In Pakistan
By Stephanie Berrong : Security Management
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in Pakistan face a deteriorating security situation, and they are finding it challenging to adapt.
Many development groups went into Pakistan too light on security, says Mike Blyth, director for Risk Strategies for RSM Consulting, who is working with NGOs and development companies in Pakistan to improve their security and risk management. One reason for this, he says, is that they failed to forecast what the risk picture would be six or 12 months after they arrived, and another reason is the U.S. government initially apportioned too little of the aid funds—as little as 1 percent, according to Blyth—to security.
Security budgets are now more appropriate, he says. But funding isn’t the only impediment. For example, Blyth says, nearly all NGOs and development services providers are using “soft” or unarmored security vehicles in their Pakistan operations. Many are now seeking armored vehicles, but they could have to wait up to a year, because of a backlog of orders for the vehicles.
Blyth says that while NGOs have traditionally relied heavily on an active acceptance strategy in which they build a rapport with the community where they provide aid, many in Pakistan are now also starting to use armed guards.
That shift is not unique to Pakistan. According to a recent study on the use of private security providers in humanitarian operations worldwide conducted by the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG), the contracting of certain security functions has become increasingly common among aid providers. The study notes, however, that “the use of commercially contracted armed protection, including armed guards and armed escorts, remains very much the exception.”
One concern for aid organizations, according to the HPG study, is the low pay and weak management of local security providers, which are used more often than international providers (generally as unarmed guards).
Blyth suggests that organizations do more mentoring of local Pakistanis to train them to serve in security management positions. Not only are expatriate security providers expensive, but they generally don’t speak the language or know the culture as well as a local would. RSM Consulting is working with its local partners to build up risk management and consulting skills.
The Netherlands-based Centre for Safety and Development (CSD), a nonprofit organization that provides NGO security training and consultancy, also trains local security directors or security focal points in Pakistan in management-level security. CSD director Ebe Brons calls the collaboration the “best of both worlds.”
“We join up with each other, so it’s almost West meets East,” Brons explains. “We have a certain structure, we have a certain way of thinking about risks, but we do not have the contents to fill this framework. And these Pakistani directors fill this framework with their knowledge and their skills, and it seems to be a good combination.”
Aid groups are also trying public outreach. InterAction, a coalition of U.S.-based international NGOs, plans to push back against groups and individuals who advocate violence against humanitarians with a global ad campaign that says it’s not okay to kill aid workers, according to John Schafer, the group’s security coordinator. “We need to build a full spectrum approach to building acceptance and that includes public-service announcements —[telling people] what we are, what we do—and going up and down streets,” Schafer says.
Experts say collaboration between development groups could be another effective tool. In 2004, a group of international NGOs in Quetta in Pakistan’s Balochistan province formed the Balochistan International NGO (BINGO) Consortium to act as a network for the exchange of security information and analysis. But in 2005, the Pakistani authorities ordered the consortium to close and terminate all activities, according to the NGO Security Collaboration Guide, which was funded by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid.
The reasons for the mandated shutdown were unclear, the guide says, although NGOs felt the decision was motivated by personality clashes and the Pakistani authorities’ general opposition to consortium structures, rather than opposition to the project.
“There is a major need for security coordination in Pakistan,” Schafer says. Currently, it is only being done informally through telephone calls and infrequent meetings, with very little analysis of the information.
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in Pakistan face a deteriorating security situation, and they are finding it challenging to adapt.
Many development groups went into Pakistan too light on security, says Mike Blyth, director for Risk Strategies for RSM Consulting, who is working with NGOs and development companies in Pakistan to improve their security and risk management. One reason for this, he says, is that they failed to forecast what the risk picture would be six or 12 months after they arrived, and another reason is the U.S. government initially apportioned too little of the aid funds—as little as 1 percent, according to Blyth—to security.
Security budgets are now more appropriate, he says. But funding isn’t the only impediment. For example, Blyth says, nearly all NGOs and development services providers are using “soft” or unarmored security vehicles in their Pakistan operations. Many are now seeking armored vehicles, but they could have to wait up to a year, because of a backlog of orders for the vehicles.
Blyth says that while NGOs have traditionally relied heavily on an active acceptance strategy in which they build a rapport with the community where they provide aid, many in Pakistan are now also starting to use armed guards.
That shift is not unique to Pakistan. According to a recent study on the use of private security providers in humanitarian operations worldwide conducted by the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG), the contracting of certain security functions has become increasingly common among aid providers. The study notes, however, that “the use of commercially contracted armed protection, including armed guards and armed escorts, remains very much the exception.”
One concern for aid organizations, according to the HPG study, is the low pay and weak management of local security providers, which are used more often than international providers (generally as unarmed guards).
Blyth suggests that organizations do more mentoring of local Pakistanis to train them to serve in security management positions. Not only are expatriate security providers expensive, but they generally don’t speak the language or know the culture as well as a local would. RSM Consulting is working with its local partners to build up risk management and consulting skills.
The Netherlands-based Centre for Safety and Development (CSD), a nonprofit organization that provides NGO security training and consultancy, also trains local security directors or security focal points in Pakistan in management-level security. CSD director Ebe Brons calls the collaboration the “best of both worlds.”
“We join up with each other, so it’s almost West meets East,” Brons explains. “We have a certain structure, we have a certain way of thinking about risks, but we do not have the contents to fill this framework. And these Pakistani directors fill this framework with their knowledge and their skills, and it seems to be a good combination.”
Aid groups are also trying public outreach. InterAction, a coalition of U.S.-based international NGOs, plans to push back against groups and individuals who advocate violence against humanitarians with a global ad campaign that says it’s not okay to kill aid workers, according to John Schafer, the group’s security coordinator. “We need to build a full spectrum approach to building acceptance and that includes public-service announcements —[telling people] what we are, what we do—and going up and down streets,” Schafer says.
Experts say collaboration between development groups could be another effective tool. In 2004, a group of international NGOs in Quetta in Pakistan’s Balochistan province formed the Balochistan International NGO (BINGO) Consortium to act as a network for the exchange of security information and analysis. But in 2005, the Pakistani authorities ordered the consortium to close and terminate all activities, according to the NGO Security Collaboration Guide, which was funded by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid.
The reasons for the mandated shutdown were unclear, the guide says, although NGOs felt the decision was motivated by personality clashes and the Pakistani authorities’ general opposition to consortium structures, rather than opposition to the project.
“There is a major need for security coordination in Pakistan,” Schafer says. Currently, it is only being done informally through telephone calls and infrequent meetings, with very little analysis of the information.
Saturday, 2 August 2008
How the next president can improve Homeland Security
Given terrorist attacks associated with recent political transitions in Spain, Britain and Pakistan, it is possible that someone inspired by al Qaeda will make another attempt in the United States over the next 18 months. While Sen. Barak Obama discussed the intersection of terrorism and technology earlier this week in Indiana, homeland security has not been a significant campaign issue thus far. But since terrorism could present the next president with his first crisis, there are a number of steps the next president should take, beginning literally the day after the election. The most obvious is to oversee an effective transition. Immediately after the election, the president-elect's homeland security team should be rapidly vetted, granted security clearances and receive extensive in-briefings— in short, form a shadow government. To its credit, the Bush administration has already laid the groundwork for this. Congress must rapidly confirm key leaders beginning on Inauguration Day. Everyone involved should take politics out of homeland security, a step that is long overdue.
Once in office, the next president should urgently increase federal support to state and local authorities. The best weapon we have to stop the next terrorist attack is less the soldier in Baghdad than the proverbial cop on the beat. Our military is stretched thin, but so are the police. As one example, New York City has 5,000 fewer police on its streets today than on 9/11. Better intelligence, information-sharing and technology can make police more productive, but with growing budget deficits, cities and states will be hard pressed simply to maintain the capabilities we have now.
Rather than cutting grant funding to cities and states as the Bush administration has attempted to do in its last two budgets, the next president must increase funding for community policing and emergency response to help communities cope with higher operating costs and new requirements.
During his first year in office, he should beef up defenses in specific risk areas such as aviation and chemical security. We can anticipate what terrorists might do from what they have already done. Aviation remains a favorite target. Since suicide hijackings have been made more difficult due to improved security at airports, the greater threat now is smuggling bombs on planes. While all passengers and luggage are physically inspected, this is not the case with air cargo that can travel on the same aircraft. Cargo data is screened, but only some of the cargo is inspected. Much more can be.
Insurgents in Iraq have tried to convert chlorine gas tanker trucks into improvised weapons. The District recognized this danger immediately after Sept. 11 and converted its Blue Plains wastewater treatment facility from chlorine gas, which can be exploited by terrorists, to liquid bleach, which cannot. While the Bush administration opposes the concept, the next administration should support new legislation that would push chemical facilities to operate in ways that are more terror-proof.
Not only should there be stronger private sector security standards, but the Department of Homeland Security must have resources to do the job we expect of it. Right now, only 430 agents are dedicated to air cargo and roughly 100 to chemical security. We don't need an army to improve homeland security, but in key areas we need more than the posse we have now.
Finally, he should redefine what we mean by homeland security and develop a new strategy. The new administration should use the development of a first-ever Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, mandated by Congress and due at the end of 2009, to evaluate the current state of homeland security, re-evaluate risks to our society and establish clear missions and priorities that will attract broad-based support. Even as we try to prevent another terrorism attack, we must also prepare for natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina and pandemics, while protecting critical networks and infrastructure from global system disruptions. He needs to find the right balance.
He must put terrorism back in perspective. It is a real risk, but not an existential threat. We underestimated the danger posed by Osama Bin Laden before 9/11; we have inflated it since. Terrorists win when governments overreact, and this is exactly what we've done. We have occupied Iraq (despite no link to 9/11), the cost of which this year alone will exceed the economic impact of 9/11. We have reorganized our government multiple times. We are a nation of immigrants, but we are less welcoming than we once were. We are a nation of laws, but we have jailed American citizens indefinitely without due process.
We are better than this. The next president can show us how to be safe without compromising our liberties and values. He can help us be better prepared without being afraid. He can build secure borders that are still open to the world. He can make homeland security a priority rather than a political prop.
Article by P.J. Crowley appeared in Washington Times
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