Showing posts with label Maritime Security. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Maritime Security. Show all posts

Tuesday, 13 March 2012

A Spotlight on Complex Security Environments - Interviews with leading companies in the International Security and Risk Management Industry

SPOTLIGHT is a networking initiative focusing on personalities in the International Security and Risk Management industry, and the Companies they run.

Our aim is to gain insight into the developing International Security sector from the perspective of experts, whilst promoting their niche services to a wide audience.

We learn about your company: the services you provide to your clients, and the challenges you face in doing so. We publish interviews via Aprodex in Focus.

The interviews are also your opportunity to reach out to engage in discussion about niche subjects. We invite and encourage stakeholders and interested 3rd parties to pose questions on the interview pages to solicit responses from the experts under the SPOTLIGHT.


To read the Interviews please browse Aprodex in Focus

  • Ted Jones, CEO of Northcott Global Solutions "The Arab Spring has shaken up the traditional Corporate Assistance Model"

  • Paul C, Director, Xenubis Providing technology to combat global threats – Xenubis stays “Ahead of the curve”.

  • Chris Holtom, Founder of the Mars Omega Partnership Ltd Building The Information Picture: Using Software To Determine Your Course Of Action In High Threat Environments

  • Tim Crockett, CEO of Pioneer Consulting Group “Maintaining personnel and resources that are ‘ready to go’: Pioneer Consulting Group flourishes in post 9-11 Era”

  • Carl David, Director, Principal Risk Solutions
    “An Ethical Approach To Risk Management Will Deliver The Best Results For Clients”

  • John Twiss, Chief Operating Officer, IMSA Ltd Establishing credibility and legitimacy in the Martitme Security Industry: IMSA Ltd has been successful by keeping delivery simple.

Registration and Log In required for full access to the Interviews.

Companies who would like to be featured in our "Operating in Complex Security Environments" Networking programme, send an email (Subject: "SPOTLIGHT Interview") to info@aprodex.com to request the interview questionnaire.

Monday, 21 February 2011

Shipping Industry Changes Stance on Armed Guards

The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), the main international trade association for shipowners, announced today that it has changed its position on the use of private armed security guards to protect merchant ships against Somali pirate attacks, including those launched from hijacked "motherships" used throughout the Indian Ocean.

ICS Chairman Spyros Polemis stated that the shipping industry required adequate protection from pirates, especially in light of the "current crisis in the Indian Ocean." Shipowners have concluded that they must either arm ships or avoid the Indian Ocean completely.

Although Mr. Polemis agreed that the eradication of piracy remained the responsibility of governments, he explained that political resistance to the use of military navies to protect trade routes has left the industry little choice but to seek protection from armed guards.

Piracy costs the global economy between U.S. $7-12 billion each year, and increasing incidents around Somalia and the Cape of Good Hope could have a detrimental effect on both the price of commodities like oil and the economies of Africa and the Middle East, increasing the strain on stability in these regions during a politically uncertain time.


ISOA Industry Insight: This press release reveals frustration from the shipping industry regarding the inadequate level of protection they have received from a high-profile international naval effort to combat piracy in the region. For many shipping companies, the additional risk and liability of having armed security on board their ships makes such a choice inappropriate; however, for those with high value or dangerous cargos, the option may be more feasible. Shipping companies that decide to utilize private security to protect their vessels and crews should ensure the companies they hire are familiar with relevant international law, that they have signed onto the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers, and, ideally, that they are members of a standards-based trade association such as ISOA.

Aprodex Comment: Interested parties and stakeholders may wish to attend the following event "Tackling Kidnap, Hostage Taking and Hijacking - 2nd Annual Conference", in London on 24th and 25th May 2011, which includes speakers addressing piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

CLICK HERE for more details and to purchase tickets.

Tuesday, 29 June 2010

IMSA in conjunction with MMWC have introduced the SSO (plus+) to their portfolio of ISPS code training.

The Aprodex Forum

Whilst delegates will still receive the MCA approved SSO certificate the aim is to give delegates more of an overview of the marsec industry in general with an emphasis on anti piracy.

We have taken the line that we can achieve in the standard 3 days of the SSO course with extra modules and later finishes what some companies do with an extra days anti piracy training (4 days) at extra cost to the delegate plus an extra night’s accommodation costs.

Delegates will come away from the course better prepared to gain employment in the marsec/anti piracy industry.

It’s not just about boots on the bridge and hardening the vessel. We cover the street cred required to gain you that valuable confidence of the Master, crew or the OIM! Like it or not the industry does have Best Management Practice (BMP) and understanding how the Industry operates is critical to the interaction with the client you are protecting.

Ship Security Officer (plus+)
SSO (plus+) Course
Introduction

The '+' of the SSO (plus+) course consists of additional modules which have been introduced into IMSA Ltd's standard certificated ISPS Code SSO Course. The modules are designed to provide additional information on merchant ships and the shipping industry, to delegates whose experience of either is slight. They also bring some informed, professional insight on the 'Threat-of-the-Day' – Piracy.

Course Aim

The aim of this training programme is to provide a Ship's Officer or Maritime Security Operator with the knowledge and skills to carry out his/her duties as a designated Ship Security Officer or a Maritime Security Operator in accordance with the International Ship and Port Facility Code. In particular, he or she will be able to:

To monitor, optimise and manage Ship’s security systems and processes
To motivate and train the crew to perform security duties
Implementation and maintenance of a Ship Security Plan

Additionally, the delegate will receive additional modules that will enable them to have a better understanding of the Maritime Security sector and their role in it.


Who Should Attend?

Ship’s officers who have been, or are likely to be, appointed as Ship Security
Officers under the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, former armed forces personnel, Maritime Security Consultants who will need this knowledge as a requirement of their position. Also those with a Maritime background looking to work in Ship/Offshore Security.

Course Content

The threats facing the maritime industry
What is security?
Understanding the ISPS Code and the changes to SOLAS
Security Levels - coordination with port facilities and the company fleet.
Arranging Ship Security Assessments & Plans including managing Ship Security
Surveys
Monitoring the performance of Ship Security Officers and security activities
Monitoring fleet security training programmes and drills
Countering piracy and hostage-taking on ships
Countering and dealing with stowaways
Understanding, specifying and purchasing security equipment
Countering the threat of smuggling
Handling and protection of security information
Firearms and their use onboard ships and in ports
Ensuring compliance with the ISPS Code
Maritime Qualifications and Industry Jargon
Counter piracy procedures
Industry best practice
Managing incidents and reporting to clients
International law applicable to the sea

Training is validated with an end of course exam. Successful delegates will be awarded an MCA internationally approved SSO certificate.

Included In The Course:

Full course materials
Copy of presentations on CD-Rom
Internationally recognised certificate
ISPS Code Book
Lunch and refreshments

Course Duration: 3 days (Tue/Wed/Thurs)

HOW TO BOOK THE COURSE OR CONTACT US:

Independent Maritime Security Associates Ltd (IMSA Ltd) only use highly experienced time served ISPS trainers to conduct SSO (plus+) courses. IMSA Ltd runs courses at the company’s offices in the Marine Skills Centre, Poole, Dorset or if required, at any location worldwide. Please contact IMSA Ltd via email at info@imsaltd.com or call 01202 696677 to discuss your ISPS Code training requirements.

Delegates will gain valuable insight into anti piracy from seasoned trainers who have operated across the maritime security spectrum.

Wednesday, 19 May 2010

Launching A New Era Of Responsibility In Maritime Security

It is widely recognised and acknowledged that the Maritime Security Industry is in a state of turmoil and chaos. The vast majority of those individuals and organizations professing to be “Maritime Security Experts” are anything but. The industry is undisciplined, unregulated and – rightly so – regarded with caution bordering on suspicion and alarm.

Recent unfortunate incidents (notably in the Horn of Africa region) have highlighted the need for the industry to get it’s act together and start imposing professional standards and weeding out the rogue elements that proliferate it.

It is with that in mind that the International Association of Maritime Security Professionals has been formed.

Acting within the terms of a robust Constitution and a rigourous Code of Conduct, the IAMSP (or, as it is more commonly referred to, MarSecPro) seeks to establish clear, professional guidelines and a strict self-regulatory environment in a bid to make this currently contentious industry more widely acceptable and accepted – by governmental and non-governmental bodies, by the shipping industry in general (including seafarers, shipowners, PandI Clubs and Insurers) and all other parties involved in the shipping industry which accounts for the carriage of some 90% of the world’s trade.

Individual and Corporate Members are drawn from within the maritime and security industries (military and civilian) and from those outside that can demonstrate an adequate depth of knowledge and/or experience that will serve the MarSecPro main objective of building a sound and reputable self-regulating professional body. In short, by establishing high standards of professionalism within the Association, membership thereof will provide potential users such as shipowners with the high degree of comfort that will allow them to select a Member in the justified confidence that the Member is professionally qualified and experienced to deliver a professional Maritime Security service.

The Association believes, and is confident that, this initiative will be seen as a great leap forward and is in the very best interests of the shipping industry – ensuring the safety, welfare and safe passage of seafarers, their vessels and cargoes.

The Association also provides a forum for expert advice and intelligence sharing, assessment of, and research into, new technologies, strategies and equipment in addition to the provision of Expert Opinion and Witnesses to the legal profession and professional comment to the media. Some Members have expressed a willingness to address conferences on all the issues surrounding Maritime Security.

Press enquiries and further details are available from jdalby@iamsp.org

Further details about the Constitution and Professional Code of Conduct are freely available on the MarsecPro web site (still under development, but live) – www.iamsp.org . See especially the “Watch this space” tab in the upper right of the Home Page.

Applications for Membership may be directed towards amcdougall@iamsp.org
The International Association of Maritime Security Professionals (MarSecPro) is a non-profit organization, registered in the UK, committed to raising the standards of the maritime security industry worldwide.

Tuesday, 9 June 2009

Companies Hire "shipriders" Against Somali Pirates

There's not a warship for miles, a small pirate skiff is speeding toward you and there's no way the creaking tub you're on can outrun the bandits. How long do you wait before you shoot?

It's just one of many possible dilemmas facing an increasing number of private security companies who offer armed escorts — known in the industry as "shipriders" — from Somali pirates.

The few companies that have begun offering armed escorts say their services have become increasingly popular since the April hijacking of the American-flagged Maersk Alabama, particularly among U.S. shipowners. One company — Hart Security UK — has reported a fourfold increase in escorted trips since it began offering them in October.

But legal problems abound for ships that carry guns.

The first hurdle is making sure the countries where ships embark and disembark the weapons will allow them to do so — a legal nightmare in corrupt Middle Eastern ports with terrorism problems.

Then there's the issue of which law applies onboard the ship if a weapon is discharged: the shooter's nationality, the law of the country whose flag the ship is flying, or the territorial waters of the country the ship is in.

In at least one case, a private security consultant said, an armed team had rented weapons from the Djibouti government then was forced to drop them over the side of the ship to avoid illegally importing them into the country where they were due to disembark. The consultant asked for anonymity because he did not wish to compromise his business.

Kenneth C. Randall, the Dean of the University of Alabama School of Law and an expert in international piracy law, said there were complex issues for companies providing legally armed private guards.

"Commercial vessels have the right of innocent passage through most coastal waters. Some nations might say once you're armed, you're no longer innocent," he said.

Many questions have yet to be tested in court: should ships wait for the pirates to fire before returning fire? Is it still self-defense if the pirates are not firing at the shooter, instead aiming at the captain's bridge? What happens if the pirates are attacking from a "mother ship" — a vessel that has already been pirated — and there are civilians onboard being used as human shields?

That's the nightmare scenario the Indian navy faced last November. Pirates hijacked a Thai fishing trawler then apparently fired on an Indian warship. The Indians returned fire, turning the Ekawat Nava 5 into a massive fireball and killing 14 of the 15 crew as well as the pirates. The surviving sailor spent six days adrift in the shark-infested ocean before another ship picked him up.

There is no public registry of all the different companies providing armed guards to ships. Some, like Lotus in Yemen, did not return calls seeking comment.

But other companies interviewed in Britain and America said interest in the newly emerging market has been stoked by the recent series of high-profile hijackings, although only a small proportion of ship owners have inquired about having armed guards onboard so far.

U.S. private security company Templar Titan is providing shipriders and has been doing around 15 escorts per month through the Gulf of Aden a month since it began the service four months ago; the teams are armed on between half and three-quarters of the passages.

Lew Knopp, who heads the company, said the maritime division of his firm has increased from 3 people to 30 within the last year.

"We are directly consulting with the U.S. government on issues of piracy, especially in the Gulf of Aden and we have attorneys reviewing and co-ordinating efforts so they fall within international rules and regulations," Knopp said. He declined to give further details, citing operational security.

Despite the challenges, interest in arming ships has shot up following the Maersk Alabama hijacking, said Hugh Martin, Hart Security UK's general manager.

"We've had a substantial increase in inquiries," he said. "There is a lot of interest from companies that are American-owned."

Martin said that when the company began offering armed escorts in October, they were doing around 5 escorted trips through the Gulf of Aden a month. Now they do around 20 trips a month and also offer the services of two vessels with helipads that accommodate up to 28 people each. They are usually hired by groups of ships to act as an escort, Martin said, and are in use every week.

He says Hart uses Yemeni guards and makes sure the weapons are legally imported and exported at both ends of the ship's journey.

"The amount of effort we put in to ensure we are legal is colossal," he said.

Britain's Maritime Asset Security and Training (MAST) is also offering armed guards, either ex-British naval or special forces personnel. MAST has established a subsidiary in Djibouti to provide a security transit service at the western end of the Gulf of Aden, which also allowed it to license the use of firearms under government approval. Phillip Cable, the director of MAST, says the company is providing the service between 30-35 times a month but only between 10-15 percent involved armed protection.

Other companies like Olive, which guards Shell in Iraq, or maritime security firm Drum Cussac say the legal implications of having armed men onboard commercial shipping are still too unclear.

"What do you do if you shoot a pirate and he surrenders to you?" asked Crispian Cuss of Olive.

But many companies are keen to diversify from Iraq and Afghanistan and are interested in the possibility of training a Somali coastguard. Recent donor conferences focused on the need to build up Somalia's ragged security services, both to combat piracy and the influx of hundreds of foreign jihadi fighters dedicated to the overthrow of the U.N.-backed government.

The millions pledged to Somalia represent a potential goldmine. Pirate attacks have dropped out of the news but still occur almost daily, and around 200 people have been killed on land in the latest round of fighting, which experts fear may lead to the establishment of an al-Qaida foothold on the Horn of Africa.

But before countries agree to spend money on a coastguard, they want to see safeguards to ensure the training or weapons they provide are not turned against them later. A U.N. report issued last December estimated over 80 percent of Somalia's soldiers and police deserted along with weapons and vehicles. A U.N. program to train 10,000 Somali police was frozen due to the high rates of desertion and corruption, which was so bad police were sometimes left without boots or belts and went unpaid for months at a time.

"If we don't learn from that failure we'll repeat the same mistake," said Rashid Abdi, a Somalia analyst at thinktank International Crisis Group. "Accountability should be critical to the donor community and it should ensure that the current project is not being as mismanaged as the previous one."

Associated Press

Sunday, 19 April 2009

How To Tackle Piracy

Making a clear determination between legitimate enemies and common enemies should be the focus of tackling piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

By Mackubin Thomas Owens for FPRI

Piracy, a scourge that had been stamped out in the 19th century, still flourishes in those Hobbesian areas of the world where order and the “rule of law” do not exist. The seizure of a US-flagged vessel, the MaerskAlabama, earlier this month and the subsequent rescue of the ship’s captain by the US Navy has alerted Americans to the fact that Somalia and its coast is such an area. Ever since the collapse of the Somali government in 1991, it has been a particularly stark example of what is now called a “failed state.”

According to statistics provided by the International Maritime Bureau, there were 293 incidents of piracy or armed robbery in 2008, of which 130 occurred off the coast of Somalia and in the nearby Gulf of Aden. Of these, about 50 were successful. With the exception of the US (in the Maersk Alabama incident) and France, most governments, shipping companies and insurers have opted to pay ransoms amounting to millions of dollars to free crews and vessels.

What is to be done? One school of thought argues that we should do little or nothing because the cost of stamping out piracy again is too high. They point out that some 21,000 ships transit the Gulf of Aden every year and maintain that 50 successful pirate attacks doesn’t really constitute much of a threat, certainly not one worth expending the resources necessary to eliminate it.

Ideas on how we might do so include arming crews or providing specialized armed detachments.

As Derek Reveron, my Naval War College colleague, observes, the costs of providing security teams aboard merchant vessels or arming crews and training them to defend the ship probably exceed the costs of paying ransom for the rare ship taken.

In addition, Reveron argues, piracy in this part of the world isn't an American problem. He contends that piracy is an annoyance, but other than offending our sense of freedom of the seas, it doesn't for the most part affect American shipping. Thus focusing on piracy is an example of the tail wagging the strategic dog. He argues that the Europeans and Asians, who are quick to demand US leadership on the one hand and criticize the United States for its actions on the other, ought to be responsible for dealing with pirates here.

But others point out that piracy is a threat to a peaceful, commercial “liberal world order.” For instance, the threat of piracy has a dampening effect on commerce, raising insurance rates and other costs of transporting goods by sea. Such increases in the cost of commerce are not good any time, but especially during a recession.

Experience seems to indicate that a “liberal world order” does not arise spontaneously as the result of some global “invisible hand” but requires the actions of a powerful state willing and able to provide the world with the “collective goods” of economic stability and international security.

Today, the United States is the only state able to provide either of these beyond its own territory, especially on the great “commons” of the sea. Thus, according to this view, the United States today must lead the other maritime commercial states in an effort to end piracy, just as Great Britain did during the 19th century.

But there are major practical problems with doing so. The first is the vast sea area, about four times the size of Texas, in which the Somali pirates operate. Patrolling an area with about 1300 nautical miles of coastline requires a huge commitment of naval resources. In fact, at any one time, the US 5th Fleet has 5-10 ships in the area. That commitment is complemented by both an EU naval force and a NATO fleet. Several other countries, including China, Russia, India, Saudi Arabia and Malaysia, have provided naval assets for anti-piracy operations in the area or will soon do so. But the area is simply too large for a continuous naval presence sufficient to deter or defeat the pirates.

Then there is the political economy of Somali piracy, which has created a network that provides intelligence, sanctuary, funding and the “mother ships” that provide the pirates with the “reach” they need for their depredations. Additionally, the pirates have demonstrated a remarkable ability to adapt to changing circumstances, avoiding the Somali coast in order to thwart anti-piracy patrols, docking at ports in other countries to refuel and lay on supplies.

But the elimination of piracy is more a question of will than of resources per se. Piracy (along with the slave trade) was crushed in the 19th century when the states of Europe, rather than tolerating the practice as they had done in the 17th and 18th centuries, decided to take action.

The effort was led by Great Britain, with the Royal Navy as the primary instrument. What made the actions successful was the determination of Great Britain and others to attack the source of piracy. The Royal Navy in particular not only captured and sank pirate ships, but also attacked pirate sanctuaries, destroying their bases.

In the 19th century, the United States also played a role in ending the piratical forays of the Barbary States of North Africa. This is one of the reasons why it has been nearly two centuries since pirates last attempted to seize a vessel flying the American flag.

After losing the protection of Great Britain as a result of America’s Declaration of Independence, American ships were preyed upon by the Barbary States - Algiers, Tunis, Morocco and Tripoli (today's Libya). Like the Europeans during the same period (and most maritime states today), the Americans deemed the cost of military action too high and opted to pay “tribute” to the Barbary States. But the demands for these bribes kept growing while the seizure of US ships only increased.

Congress authorized the construction of several frigates and President Thomas Jefferson dispatched them in 1801 for “policing actions” in the Mediterranean after the pasha of Tripoli declared war on the United States. During the next several years, the fledgling American Navy bombarded the harbors of Algiers, Morocco and Tunis or threatened them with bombardment. As a result of these actions, these states agreed to cease cooperating with Tripoli. But the pasha remained defiant.

In 1804, a naval force under Captain Stephen Decatur boldly sailed into Tripoli harbor, where he set fire to the captured USS Philadelphia, later rescuing its crew, bombarding the fortified town, and boarding the pasha's own fleet where it lay at anchor. In April 1805, Captain William Eaton led an expedition consisting of US Marines, mercenaries, and Arab rebels across many miles of desert to take Tripoli's second city, Derna, by surprise, largely ending the depredations of the Barbary pirates against US ships in the Mediterranean.

To adopt such an approach to piracy today, however, would require a return to a distinction in the traditional understanding of international law, one that did not extend legal protections to individuals who do not deserve them. This distinction was first made by the Romans and subsequently incorporated into international law by way of medieval and early modern European jurisprudence, e.g. writings on the law of nations by such authors as Hugo Grotius and Emer de Vattel.

The Romans distinguished between bellum, war against legitimus hostis, a legitimate enemy and guerra, war against latrunculi - pirates, robbers, brigands and outlaws - “the common enemies of mankind.” The former, bellum, became the standard for interstate conflict, and it is here that the Geneva Conventions and other legal protections were meant to apply. They do not apply to the latter, Guerra - indeed, punishment for latrunculi traditionally has been summary execution, although the extreme punishment was not always exacted. The point is that until recently, no international code has extended legal protection to pirates.

As Grotius wrote in Mare Librum (The Free Sea), “all peoples or their princes in common can punish pirates and others, who commit derelicts on the sea against the law of nations.” And more forcefully, Vattel wrote in his 1738 treatise, The Law of Nations, that “legitimate and formal warfare must be carefully distinguished from those illegitimate or informal wars, or rather predatory expeditions, undertaken, either without lawful authority, or without apparent cause, as likewise without the usual formalities, and solely with a view to plunder.”

Once this distinction is revived, it opens the way for the only real way to stamp out piracy, as was done in the 19th century: the use of force to wipe out the pirate lairs. Under the old understanding of international law, a sovereign state has the right to strike the territory of another if that state is not able to curtail the activities of latrunculi.

As John Locke understood, pirates are in a “state of nature” relative to political society. And political society has the right to defend itself against such individuals:

“That, he who has suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own name, and he alone can remit: the damnified person has this power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender, by right of self-preservation, as every man has a power to punish the crime, to prevent its being committed again, by the right he has of preserving all mankind, and doing all reasonable things he can in order to that end: and thus it is, that every man, in the state of nature, has a power to kill a murderer, both to deter others from doing the like injury, which no reparation can compensate, by the example of the punishment that attends it from everybody, and also to secure men from the attempts of a criminal, who having renounced reason, the common rule and measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lyon or a tyger, one of those wild savage beasts, with whom men can have no society nor security: and upon this is grounded that great law of nature, Who so sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed.”

The United States acted in accord with this understanding in the early 19th century. In response to raids from Spanish Florida by Creeks, Seminoles and escaped slaves, General Andrew Jackson, acting on the basis of questionable authority, invaded Florida, not only attacking and burning Seminole villages but also capturing a Spanish fort at St Marks. He also executed two British citizens whom he accused of aiding the marauders.

Most of President James Monroe’s cabinet, especially Secretary of War John Calhoun, wanted Jackson’s head, but Secretary of State John Quincy Adams came to Jackson’s defense. He contended that the United States should not apologize for Jackson’s preemptive expedition but should insist that Spain either garrison Florida with enough forces to prevent marauders from entering the United States or “cede to the United States a province, which is in fact a derelict, open to the occupancy of every enemy, civilized or savage, of the United States, and serving no other earthly purpose than as a post of annoyance to them.” As Adams had written earlier, it was his opinion “that the marauding parties ought to be broken up immediately.” As John Gaddis has observed, Adams believed that the United States “could no more entrust [its] security to the cooperation of enfeebled neighboring states than to the restraint of agents controlled, as a result, by no state.”

Unfortunately, we have permitted legalism and moralism to twist our understanding of the “rule of law” into something that Grotius, Vattel, Locke or the Founders would no longer recognize. For instance, European navies have been advised to avoid capturing Somali pirates since under the European Human Rights Act, any pirate taken into custody would be entitled to claim refugee status in a European state, with attendant legal rights and protections.

Americans must understand that if we really wish to root out piracy today, we must be willing to take strong steps. But these steps will require us to change the current mindset, which does not distinguish between war against legitimate enemies and war against “the common enemies of mankind,” which include not only pirates but also terrorists.

Mackubin Thomas Owens, an FPRI senior fellow, is Associate Dean of Academics for Electives and Directed Research and Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College in Newport RI and the editor-designate of Orbis. He also served as a member of the “Future of War” Panel of the 2007 Defense Science Board Summer Study.

ISN - INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND SECURITY NETWORK

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Wednesday, 16 July 2008

Somalia and Nigeria are biggest piracy hotspots

MORE than one-third of the piracy incidents reported worldwide in the first six months of this year took place in Somalia and Nigeria.

Out of the 114 piracy attacks reported to the International Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre in the first half of 2008, 24 were off the coast of Somalia and 18 offshore Nigeria.

The failed state of Somalia remained the global black spot with a spate of violent hijackings pushing out well into the main sea lane in the Gulf of Aden. Of the 24 actual and attempted Somalia attacks, 19 were in the Gulf of Aden.

“In the Gulf of Aden at least eight vessels reported being fired upon by pirates armed with rocket propelled grenade launchers and automatic weapons,” the IMB said.

In Nigeria there were 18 attacks largely centred on the port of Lagos.

“Lagos is becoming an increasingly dangerous port, with the number of reported attacks in the area growing from 8 in the first six months of 2007 to 12 for the corresponding period in 2008,” it said.

According to the IMB, in the first six months of 2008, 71 vessels were boarded, 12 vessels were hijacked and 11 vessels were fired upon. A total of 190 crew members were taken hostage, six kidnapped, seven killed and another seven are missing and presumed dead.

“The frequency and level of violence directed at seafarers is cause for alarm. The abduction of crew and the increasing use of automatic weapons remains unacceptable,” said Potengal Mukundan, director of the IMB.

Article appeared in Lloyds List

Saturday, 21 June 2008

The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code

The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) was initiated by the United States Coast Guard (USCG) in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Adopted by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in December 2002 for implementation by 01st July 2004 through Chapter XI-2 (Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security) of the International Conference for the Safety Of Life At Sea (SOLAS)

It is, in essence, a comprehensive set of measures designed to enhance the security of ships and port facilities against the perceived threat of terrorist attacks. It is a two-piece set of legislation describing minimum requirements. Part A provides mandatory requirements while Part B gives guidance in its implementation.

The security of Ships and port facilities is a Risk management activity and it follows therefore that the reduction/elimination in the source of threat is of paramount importance.

In order to determine what security measures are appropriate, Governments must assess the threat and evaluate the risk of a potential unlawful act.

Because each ship and each port facility is subject to different threats, the method by which they will meet the specific requirements of this ISPS Code will be determined and eventually be approved by the Administration or Contracting Government, as the case may be.

In order to communicate the threat at a port facility or for a ship and to initiate the appropriate response actions the Contracting Government must set the appropriate security level. The security level creates a link between the ship and the port facility, since it triggers the implementation of appropriate security measures for the ship and for the port facility. If the flag state of a ship discharging/loading at say a UK port facility instructs that ship to raise its Security Level then the Port should raise their level accordingly.

As threat increases, the only logical counteraction is to reduce vulnerability. This ISPS Code provides several ways to reduce vulnerabilities. Each ship and each port facility will have to determine the measures needed to intensify its security measures to appropriately offset the threat by reducing its vulnerability.

Monday, 16 June 2008

Maritime Security Services in SE Asia

To address the diverse maritime security challenges facing areas of the world today, a growing number of PSC's offer a wide range of maritime security services. Being part of the overall process of the privatization of the military and security services, the majority of companies presently operating in the maritime sector in South East Asia emerged after the end of the cold war and increased as a result of 9/11. Many PSC's offering maritime security in the SE Asia region are either linked to or are part of either larger PSC's or transnational corporations outside the security industry. Whilst many of the larger companies are based in the US and the UK, a number of them have established branch offices in the Asian region in recent Years. One example is Hart, which has opened an office in Singapore. A number of smaller companies have been established in the region, such as Background Asia, also in Singapore.

The number of PSC's offering maritime services is rising as clients are increasingly willing to pay for the protection of the maritime assets and employees. Such clients include shop owners, insurance companies, yacht owners, banks, and gas and oil companies with interests in the region. To cater to the needs of all these clients, the services offered are equally diverse. Whilst some companies specialize in the protection of specific assets, most companies offer services for different types of facilities which focus largely on the protection of ports, underwater assets, offshore energy installations and their supply chains, fishing grounds and a large variety of vessels including slow-moving commercial ships, fishing vessels, cruise ships, tugs and navy vessels. In order to guarantee the protection of these often foreign assets, a large variety of specific services id offered by PSC's ranging from risk assessment to crisis management, assistance with security plans and risk analysis consulting services either consisting of general political risk reports published an updated regularly, or client-specific risk assessments. These range fro port or vessel threat assessments and pre-employment screening to crisis management planning.

Services offered address threats posed by smugglers, fraudsters, pirates and terrorists, and prepare companies for accidents and natural hazards. Due to these factors, PSC's have been able to conduct their services in the region in recent years and bring to bare a considerable influence on the protection of assets and assessment of risks in the maritime sector. They also have an impact on the decision-making process in the private and public sector within and outside Southwest Asia.