Syria: Aim For A Changed Regime, Not Regime Change

With each day’s tragic news of further tyranny in Syria the chorus for some form of armed intervention gets louder, but promoting such unrealistic ambitions keeps a forlorn hope alive which does nothing to relieve the suffering of the Syrian people. Too often calls for military intervention, a No Fly Zone or ‘safe areas’ within Syria are simply not thought through yet they persist, regardless of how detached they are from reality and the art of the possible. A yearning to end the violence in Syria is no excuse to abandon reason in favour of impossible, irrelevant or impractical ideas born of a need to be doing something. Nor should the oppression in Syria be automatically treated like that in Saddam’s Iraq or Gaddafi’s Libya, each case has a different context and constituent parts and must be treated specifically. Unfortunately, however, foreign powers appear determined to adopt generic measures which have been used before instead of exploring alternative approaches to the catastrophe in Syria.  

Clearly, Syria is a large and complex crisis with no easy solution, but the default conclusion that the repressive regime in Damascus must be overthrown is an instinctive reaction that should be challenged. The least difficult route to ending the violence in Syria is not through regime change but changing the regime. International efforts should not be focused on military intervention but on changing behaviour where it matters - in the corridors of power in Damascus, and specifically in the House of Al-Assad.

It is obvious that Bashar Al-Assad is out of his depth. He inherited an autocratic mantle he was ill-suited, ill-prepared and ill-equipped for. Patently, his regime can ruthlessly oppress but he is no ‘natural’ tyrant, lacking the fearsome or psychotic persona of an Idi Amin, Saddam Husain or Colonel Gaddafi. Instead, being tall and thin with a high forehead and flimsy moustache, there is something Fawlty-esque about him, while his quiet and slightly squeaky voice is more suited to a doctor than a dictator. After all, he chose to follow a medical career and had his eldest brother Basil not been killed in a car accident in 1994 Bashar would have continued his ophthalmologist studies at London’s Western Eye Hospital. Rarely can the heir apparent of an authoritarian regime been so devoid of raw and lifelong ambition. How Saddam’s pitiless sons must have looked across the border with bemusement and contempt, for theirs was a proper apprenticeship in tyranny.

In the event, Bashar had only 6 years in which to prepare for the dynastic throne and to replace his previous desire to save life and heal people with a cruel determination to hold onto power regardless of human cost. Eleven years later his regime is slaughtering civilians and the current crisis has exposed that he lacks the skills, qualities and power to deal with the emergency around him. Prior to this calamity his decade in office was characterised by statements and policies which sent out mixed and confusing messages and he remained an enigma: was he a tyrant happy to oppress at home and offend outsiders, or a moderate who would reform Syria and fully rejoin the international community? Foreign governments should have recognised this dichotomy and done more to help Dr Jekyll put down Mr Hyde. Their failure to do so is costing many Syrians dear.

The vacillation in Bashar’s rule may indicate one or more of the following: a dithering and indecisive personality that cannot govern effectively, a poor attempt to follow a dual-path approach which introduces slow change whilst keeping regime hawks happy, or a weak presidency that cannot exert authority over the views of hard-liners who hold real power in Syria. None of these possibilities equip him to respond adequately to the demands for change his people deservedly ask for. His increasingly fantastic appraisals of the situation in Syria suggest he has a dubious grip on reality, his refusal to implement concrete democratic changes call into question his leadership qualities, and the continued murderous oppression in parts of Syria indicates that, if he wants to stop the violence, he has little real authority over his regime. Syria is adrift without a true Captain at the helm and instead of closing Embassies, making bombastic statements and taking half-hearted threatening measures, the international community should be doing more to help Assad become the leader Syria needs. He has had responsibility thrust upon him, and evidently he is not up to the task. The Syrian people need help, but so does their President. Redeem him, and that will help them. Of course this would be an extremely difficult task but changing the regime would be less difficult and less bloody than regime change. It would also provide a better idea of what Syria will become where other popular options like ‘arm the rebels’ merely open the lid on Pandora’s Box.       

Lacklustre international efforts to engage positively with Bashar Al-Assad over the past decade (when did a British, US or European Head of State last visit Damascus?) make influencing him now much more difficult. The 2011 window of opportunity in which to do so before violence in Syria spiralled out of control has passed. Yet the Herculean task needed now to establish a détente with Damascus that engaged with Assad and cultivated positive change in Syria is more achievable than an imposed military intervention. One is just within the art of the possible, the other is not, and it was refreshing to hear a Syrian opposition group member on BBC Radio 4’s Today programme reiterating the senselessness of pursuing impossible military options. Sadly, by prematurely recognising Syrian opposition groups as the de facto authority in Syria the UK and other key states have already decided that Bashar is so thoroughly part of the problem that he cannot become part of the solution. However, the refusal of Russia and China to do so keeps a bridge open by which a way to engage with Assad might still be achieved.  

Of course, if Bashar has transmogrified from a career physician to psychopathic tyrant then efforts to exploit his potential as a moderate are absolutely pointless and regime change may be inevitable. But if he is an accidental tyrant floundering out of his depth, at a loss on how to manage change in Syria, isolated, weak and unable to oppose hawks within his own power base, then international efforts should be made to reach out to him, to encourage any moderate instinct, improve his ability to lead and govern peacefully, to strengthen his political authority and weaken the position of hard-liners who advocate oppression.  

If Assad is being pulled in two directions, within himself and within the regime, foreign governments must do more to promote the doctor and not the dictator in him. Focussing on impossible military options and treating him as a pariah may be popular responses but they will do little to relieve the agony of the Syrian people. Perhaps it is better to accept that he retains significant popular support, that his regime is not vulnerable and that, despite the present catastrophe, the hope many Syrians had of a greater liberty under his rule can still be peacefully achieved. That may be a remote possibility but it is worth pursuing.

Paul Smyth

paul.smyth@r3iconsulting.com

14 Mar 12

A Spotlight on Complex Security Environments - Interviews with leading companies in the International Security and Risk Management Industry

SPOTLIGHT is a networking initiative focusing on personalities in the International Security and Risk Management industry, and the Companies they run.

Our aim is to gain insight into the developing International Security sector from the perspective of experts, whilst promoting their niche services to a wide audience.

We learn about your company: the services you provide to your clients, and the challenges you face in doing so. We publish interviews via Aprodex in Focus.

The interviews are also your opportunity to reach out to engage in discussion about niche subjects. We invite and encourage stakeholders and interested 3rd parties to pose questions on the interview pages to solicit responses from the experts under the SPOTLIGHT.


To read the Interviews please browse Aprodex in Focus

• Ted Jones, CEO of Northcott Global Solutions "The Arab Spring has shaken up the traditional Corporate Assistance Model"

• Paul C, Director, Xenubis Providing technology to combat global threats – Xenubis stays “Ahead of the curve”.

• Chris Holtom, Founder of the Mars Omega Partnership Ltd Building The Information Picture: Using Software To Determine Your Course Of Action In High Threat Environments

• Tim Crockett, CEO of Pioneer Consulting Group “Maintaining personnel and resources that are ‘ready to go’: Pioneer Consulting Group flourishes in post 9-11 Era”

• Carl David, Director, Principal Risk Solutions
  “An Ethical Approach To Risk Management Will Deliver The Best Results For Clients”

• John Twiss, Chief Operating Officer, IMSA Ltd Establishing credibility and legitimacy in the Martitme Security Industry: IMSA Ltd has been successful by keeping delivery simple.

Registration and Log In required for full access to the Interviews.

Companies who would like to be featured in our "Operating in Complex Security Environments" Networking programme, send an email (Subject: "SPOTLIGHT Interview") to info@aprodex.com to request the interview questionnaire.

Homeland Security: TSA Using Covert Operatives To Test Security Measures

The Transportation Security Administration uses undercover, or covert, testing to approximate techniques that terrorists may use to identify vulnerabilities in and measure the performance of airport security systems.

During these tests, undercover inspectors attempt to pass threat objects through passenger and baggage screening systems, and access secure airport areas. In response to a request by the US Congress, the General Accountability Office examined the TSA's strategy for conducting covert testing of the transportation system and the extent to which the agency has designed and implemented its covert tests to achieve identified goals; and the results of TSA's national aviation covert tests conducted from September 2002 to June 2007, and the extent to which TSA uses the results of these tests to mitigate security vulnerabilities.

To conduct this work, GAO analyzed covert testing documents and data and interviewed TSA and transportation industry officials.

TSA has designed and implemented risk-based national and local covert testing programs to achieve its goals of identifying vulnerabilities and measuring the performance of the aviation security system, and has begun to determine the extent to which covert testing will be used in non-aviation modes of transportation. TSA's Office of Inspection (OI) used information on terrorist threats to design and implement its national covert tests and determine at which airports to conduct tests based on the likelihood of a terrorist attack.

However, OI did not systematically record the causes of test failures or practices that resulted in higher pass rates for tests. Without systematically recording reasons for test failures, such as failures caused by screening equipment not working properly, as well as reasons for test passes, TSA is limited in its ability to mitigate identified vulnerabilities.

OI officials stated that identifying a single cause for a test failure is difficult since failures can be caused by multiple factors. TSA recently redesigned its local covert testing program to more effectively measure the performance of passenger and baggage screening systems and identify vulnerabilities.

However, it is too early to determine whether the program will meet its goals since it was only recently implemented and TSA is still analyzing the results of initial tests. While TSA has a well established covert testing program in commercial aviation, the agency does not regularly conduct covert tests in non-aviation modes of transportation.

Select domestic and foreign transportation organizations and DHS components use covert testing to identify security vulnerabilities in non-aviation settings. However, TSA lacks a systematic process for coordinating with these organizations. TSA covert tests conducted from September 2002 to June 2007 have identified vulnerabilities in the commercial aviation system at airports of all sizes, and the agency could more fully use the results of tests to mitigate identified vulnerabilities.

While the specific results of these tests and the vulnerabilities they identified are classified, covert test failures can be caused by multiple factors, including screening equipment that does not detect a threat item, Transportation Security Officers, formerly known as screeners, not properly following TSA procedures when screening passengers, or TSA screening procedures that do not provide sufficient detail to enable TSOs to identify the threat item.

TSA's Administrator and senior officials are routinely briefed on covert test results and are provided with test reports that contain recommendations to address identified vulnerabilities. However, TSA lacks a systematic process to ensure that OI's recommendations are considered and that the rationale for implementing or not implementing OI's recommendations is documented.

Without such a process, TSA is limited in its ability to use covert test results to strengthen aviation security. TSA officials stated that opportunities exist to improve the agency's processes in this area. In May 2008, GAO issued a classified report on TSA's covert testing program. That report contained information that was deemed either classified or sensitive. This version of the report summarizes our overall findings and recommendations while omitting classified or sensitive security information.

Article appeared in The Conservative Voice

Commercial Demining and Security Industries Consolidating, Merging

Commentary on providers of Demining and EOD services, from "Political Minefields".

"There have always been links between the commercial demining, private security and defense industries. In the early 1990s, arms and security companies like Royal Ordnance (now BAE Systems Land and Armaments), MECHEM (part of South African arms firm DENEL), Saracen International and DSL (now ArmorGroup) played a prominant role in the developing sector of ‘humanitarian’ demining. In those early years, some commercial demining companies were accused of ‘double dipping’ for being involved in both mine production and clearance.

These days we seem to be observing even greater consolidation – blurring the lines between civilian demining companies and the more militarized private security contractors. This has been driven largely by the security contracting boom in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as commercial deminers working in much more insecure conditions than previously.

DynCorp, which has a particularly controversial reputation as a provider of private security, police and counternarcotics services, is one of the three main pre-selected contractors for the State Department’s mine action programs. The other two State Department contractors, ArmorGroup and RONCO have were recently bought up by global security giant Group 4 Securicor (see this article on the RONCO purchase, and this one on ArmorGroup).

Other demining and EOD firms are moving into private security provision. They often developed an internal security capacity while working in a dangerous place and then found it profitable to provide this service to other clients. EODT claims to offer “a range of direct security solutions for clients in high-risk situations.” MineTech sells “highly skilled Explosive Detection Dogs to security and affiliated companies.” UXB “provides armed security services in the middle-east.”

To a certain extent this merging of private security contracting and commercial demining makes sense. Both activities occur in conflicted regions, rely on similar logistical supply chains and draw on an overlapping pool of personnel — mostly former soldiers. Mine action, while less profitable, may also provide a more stable and less risky part of a security company’s portfolio.

However, I believe there are some real dangers in smudging the distinction between demining, which has often been viewed as a civilian and humanitarian endeavor, and the militarized industry of private security. If demining becomes associated with a military campaign, it threatens the lives of civilian humanitarian deminers working for NGOs. Moreover, in my own field research I have found private security companies are far less likely to understand local developmental needs, cultural sensitivies and humanitarian priorities than NGOs and local authorities."

Aprodex Comment: Whilst the concerns are clearly valid, the situation need not be so if NGO's and the PSC community worked out better ways of working together and cooperating in such theatres, rather than one group eyeing the other with suspicion and nervous apprehension - See NGO's and Private Security Companies for addtional commentary.

PSC's Stepping in to help guard UK Military Bases?

British troops in Iraq and Afghanistan could find their bases being protected by private security guards as defence chiefs seek to cut costs and release soldiers for other duties.

Ministry of Defence sources confirmed last night that the department was in advanced discussions with private security companies (PSCs) over extending the role of "mercenaries", who are often former soldiers.

The Government has already made extensive use of armed private guards, particularly for protection duties in Iraq in the past five years. Ministers admitted last month that the cost of such services for the past two years was more than £56m, while a further £19.6m was spent in Afghanistan.

Until now the Government has resisted a radical increase in business with the private firms. But limited PSC guarding operations, including at Basra Palace in southern Iraq before it was handed back to local forces, were considered a success. A report to the Chief of the General Staff, seen by The Independent on Sunday, said officers returning from tours in Basra reported that "the value of freeing soldiers for wider operational tasks, while not relinquishing responsibility for overall unit/base security, was warmly welcomed".

The MoD's Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) unit has been studying improvements to base security, including more extensive use of CCTV and alarms, and extra security from outside the forces.

The internal report said: "Technological solutions are being explored to improve base security on operations which should help to improve security and reduce the number of military guards at fixed locations. Details are classified, but substantial work is being carried out within DE&S, building on the Northern Ireland experience."

This article appeared in the Independent

Secrets Behind Surveillance and Counter-surveillance

Countersurveillance is one tool in a kit of protective intelligence tools used by well educated protection professionals.

The key to successful prevention, disruption, and mitigation of a potential threat against a client is the employment of effective surveillance and countersurveillance.

Countersurveillance is a proactive strategy that seeks to prevent and disrupt the surveillance activities of criminals, terrorists, and those that have the potential to harm a client or their assets.

Providing effective protection to clients depends on carrying out advanced surveillance and countersurveillance operations in such a way that it forestalls and prevents attempts by hostile parties to gather and act upon information about a client's activities or interests in such a way that it could cause harm (like kidnapping, robbery, extortion, and even death).

Surveillance The fact is that sophisticated criminals and terrorist groups conduct surveillance on their targets before perpetrating a crime or launching an attack. During their surveillance, for example, nefarious individuals look for patterns in the daily activities of their victims - they might study how a protective security detail of an important client, for example, is organized, how they operate, and then devise plans to exploit perceived vulnerabilities.

Types of Surveillance. Surveillance, the process by which intelligence information is acquired in the field, requires careful technique and dedicated patience to gather good information. Surveillance teams, to be effectual, must be aware of any countersurveillance tactics that might be used by those protecting their purported targets.

Surveillance can range from simple observation in person for a few moments to clandestine and highly technical operations involving multiple persons or teams and expensive equipment for eavesdropping and so forth.

Effective Countersurveillance. Countersurveillance involves altering travel routes and routines, thereby confusing and intentionally misleading would-be assailants. Some strategies that can be employed by countersurveillance teams include making appropriate use of safe houses and alternative residences for clients as well as using an irregular schedule.

Confounding adversarial surveillance teams through deceptive countersurveillance techniques, however, is only one component of a comprehensive countersurveillance strategy. Ultimately, successful countersurveillance teams don't wait for something to go wrong before taking action; they, instead, adopt a modus operandi of perpetual preparedness by remaining vigilant and thinking proactively.

One way that countersurveillance teams can anticipate different types of threats is to engage in "red teaming"exercises where mock perpetrators conduct surveillance operations and help spot potential vulnerabilities. When problems or soft spots in the countersurveillance are identified, solutions could entail introducing more variety in a client's schedule to make their daily 'routine' more unpredictable.

A concluding - but by no means final - note about countersurveillance is the commensurate need for developed protective skills that are typically gained through years of residency experience, limited, 'spot' training through various certification programs or through advanced education and degree-granting programs that specialize in protective security and intelligence.

Regardless of where or how one acquires the necessary protection skills, knowledge, experience, and education, a countersurveillance professional should possess a deep understanding of how surveillance works, how to collect intelligence, how to analyze and identify possible threats based on that intelligence, how to develop and implement procedures to protect a client facing threats, and how to detect, mitigate, and where possible prevent emerging threats to a client.