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Network Members share opinions and experiences of the many diverse “Global Risk Management” products and services on the market, and solicit conversations with suppliers and interested 3rd parties, both from within and out of the Network.
Our aim is to create discussion between buyer and supplier. By creating discussion we can highlight the good and the bad; share, develop and refine service offerings (and best practice); help strengthen operational security management strategy - and demand accountability publically where necessary!
For Suppliers, The Aprodex Forum provides extensive and unlimited opportunity to post comments / press releases / general or specific topics of interest, for each and every applicable service category.
Our target audience includes key executives, managers and decision makers across commerce, from Fortune 1000 companies to small and medium sized enterprises, to non-governmental organisations operating across the globe. In particular, CEOs, COOs, SVPs, VPs, AGMs, DGMs, MDs, Directors and Heads of: Security, Security Operations, Offshore and Onshore Security, HSSE, Safety & Security, Security & Environment, Emergency Response Planning, Asset Protection, CBRNE, Hazmat, Hazchem, Infrastructure, Facilities, Operations & Strategy, Risk & Crisis Management, Fire and Safety Engineering, Process Safety, Operations, Contingency Planning, Risk Assessment, Loss & Preventions, Logistics and Project Managers, Security Co-ordinators, Policy Advisors... and more
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Saturday, 5 March 2011
Our New Security Paradigm - Who Can Help?
In the period since the end of the Cold War, the range of problems defined as threatening personal, group, state, international and global security has widened considerably, as has the range of agencies involved in providing such security.
Together, the events of 11 September 2001, the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004, Hurricane Katrina the USA in 2005, and the 7/7 attacks in London in Summer 2005 - and the multi-agency response to them - exemplify this new security paradigm.
It is clear that the risk of major armed conflict between states, which has absorbed soldiers', scholars' and statesmen's attention for the last two centuries, has been compounded by new threats of economic dislocation, crime, drugs, environmental damage, state collapse, non-state actors, anti-elite action, 'super-terrorism' and the re-emergence of racial, religious and tribal tension. These factors threaten the lives and wellbeing of many people and groups, the fabric of society and the structure of the nation state.
Aprodex provides access to a global network of experts to address your asset protection and loss prevent requirements - visit: http://www.aprodex.com/
Together, the events of 11 September 2001, the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004, Hurricane Katrina the USA in 2005, and the 7/7 attacks in London in Summer 2005 - and the multi-agency response to them - exemplify this new security paradigm.
It is clear that the risk of major armed conflict between states, which has absorbed soldiers', scholars' and statesmen's attention for the last two centuries, has been compounded by new threats of economic dislocation, crime, drugs, environmental damage, state collapse, non-state actors, anti-elite action, 'super-terrorism' and the re-emergence of racial, religious and tribal tension. These factors threaten the lives and wellbeing of many people and groups, the fabric of society and the structure of the nation state.
Aprodex provides access to a global network of experts to address your asset protection and loss prevent requirements - visit: http://www.aprodex.com/
Friday, 4 March 2011
Aerial Surveillance Capability: an integrated airborne surveillance project
Registered Network Member would like to talk to anyone interested in an integrated airborne surveillance project of ours which could complement a land-based and water-borne maritime security presence, giving live feed into C4i facilities or direct to handheld, in all 3 dimensions.
Using Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and reversionary optics, all coupled through a satellite uplink, our project offers longer range surveillance and ultimately inexpensive risk mitigation to any 3 dimensional security system. The system is proven in the gulf and Africa.
SEE ORIGINAL POST ON THE APRODEX FORUM
Using Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) and reversionary optics, all coupled through a satellite uplink, our project offers longer range surveillance and ultimately inexpensive risk mitigation to any 3 dimensional security system. The system is proven in the gulf and Africa.
SEE ORIGINAL POST ON THE APRODEX FORUM
A No Fly Zone for Libya?
A version of this article is featured on the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) web site (http://www.rusi.org/). It is used here with the author’s permission.
Now that western states have recovered most of their citizens from Libya calls for a military response to the Libyan crisis have grown. In particular increasing voices have talked of the establishment of a No Fly Zone (NFZ), principally because such zones have been previously employed over Iraq and Bosnia. However, it is important to explain why such a course of action must not be rushed into. Indeed, a NFZ over Libya may be unnecessary and should probably be avoided.
Achieving The Desired Effect
The logic for mounting a NFZ over Libya is that it would prevent Gaddafi using aircraft and helicopters to suppress the popular opposition to his regime. However, the incidence of such attacks appears small, and with reports of Libyan pilots either defecting to Malta or abandoning their aircraft to avoid attacking Libyan targets, and some air bases falling within areas now beyond government control, Gaddafi’s use of air assets appears somewhat constrained. The actual danger posed by Gaddafi’s bombers and helicopter gunships therefore might not necessitate a NFZ. For example, if aircraft are only flying from one airfield and at very low sortie rates (perhaps only two flights a day) other measures such as an international threat to indict Libyan pilots or the closure of the runway may achieve the desired effect without resort to a NFZ. In addition, establishing an effective and enduring NFZ takes time (weeks not days) and other means may achieve the same effect more quickly. Indeed, if Gaddafi’s support base unravels his dictatorship may collapse before the diplomatic process and military preparations necessary to mount a NFZ could be completed.
Having The Right Mandate
To achieve the desired effect a NFZ must have a mandate that facilitates enforcement and detected breaches of the NFZ must be dealt with in a timely manner. The process authorizing enforcement must be responsive and efficient with Rules of Engagement (ROE) that allow for swift action. A NFZ without a robust mandate and timely force is open to challenge. If Gaddafi’s aircraft were able to breach the NFZ without consequence the NFZ would become a liability, reinforcing his position. With or without the umbrella of a United Nations (UN) Resolution the nations imposing a NFZ should agree a common mandate which they will uphold to avoid the situation where aircraft policing the zone enforce it to varying degrees. Should a UN Security Council Resolution be pursued then a resolution based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter which authorizes ‘all means‘ should be sought. Without the right mandate a NFZ would lack teeth, and policy value.
Understanding Coercion
Before embarking on a policy to impose a NFZ over Libya the international community must understand that enforcing a NFZ is a coercive mission. As such it must only be undertaken if participating nations are prepared to become more fully engaged in Libya. The readiness to accept escalation is an imperative because a NFZ may be challenged. Thus, if Libyan air defence radars or surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) were used against aircraft policing the NFZ, to enforce the zone aircrews would expect to take self-defence measures. Subsequent attacks against Libyan military air defence targets would be an obvious escalation of the crisis.
Although Gaddafi’s opponents might welcome such air attacks, given the history of his regime it is difficult to predict the unintentional consequences of such an upturn in violence. Whilst any bombing raid against regime assets might ignite an unpredictable response, the size and enduring nature of a NFZ would demand a greater kinetic (Offensive Counter-Air (OCA)) effort than that needed for a single or occasional strike against, for example, a runway. An OCA capability is necessary to protect aircraft policing the NFZ and it is complicated by the existence of mobile SAM systems, which are more difficult to target than static SAMs. Fundamentally, if a low level of coercion does not achieve its objective an increase in coercion is necessary to avoid failure. Consequently, before deciding on a NFZ policy for Libya foreign governments should judge whether Gaddafi would submit to one and consider what additional measures would be employed if he did not.
Similarly, it is extremely difficult to enforce a NFZ against helicopters, especially when civilian helicopters are also operating in the NFZ area. Were the international community to establish a NFZ in Libya and it did not prevent Gaddafi from attacking his people with helicopter gunships nations would find themselves in a dilemma: accept the inherent loss of face when the NFZ is inadequate or take more aggressive steps to prevent helicopter activity (i.e. kinetic attacks on ground targets). Neither option would be attractive, so the commitment needed to deal with such matters must be understood and acquiesced before a NFZ strategy is embarked upon.
A Different Context
Linking the perceived success of the mid-1990s NFZ over Bosnia to today’s crisis in Libya is unhelpful. For a number of reasons the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air campaign over Bosnia (Operation DENY FLIGHT) is not a useful model for Libya. First, there are crucial contextual differences between Bosnia and Libya that undermine the adoption of a common ‘solution’ to both crises, and second, the task of enforcing a NFZ over Libya would be more difficult than it may casually appear.
An obvious contextual difference is the prevailing geo-security environment. When NATO embarked on Op DENY FLIGHT it was able to focus almost exclusively on the Balkan crisis. This emphasis included the substantial deployment of troops to Bosnia, adding purpose to the NATO air campaign which provided protection and support to those land forces. Today, NATO’s principal focus is on Afghanistan and an air campaign over Libya would have to compete with the immense priority afforded this ongoing conflict where efforts are necessary to secure gains that were made in 2010. Neither is it likely there is any appetite amongst NATO nations to deploy troops into Libya when the alliance is so heavily engaged in Afghanistan and the Iraq insurgency still casts a shadow over the region. The strategic context that facilitated the Bosnian NFZ does not exist today. In the immediate post-Cold War period NATO may have looked favourably on an opportunity to demonstrate its continued utility but today there is little enthusiasm to place additional operational demands upon existing obligations.
There are also differences between Libya today and Iraq between 1991-2003, where two NFZs were imposed in the north and south of the country. These were established after the 1991 Gulf War when coalition aircraft were being used to monitor Saddam’s persecution of Kurdish and Shi’a minorities. The NFZs protected coalition activity from Iraqi interference; their actual ability to prevent Iraqi air attacks on civilians was limited as they were not continuously patrolled and many of the coalition aircraft policing them were ground attack and reconnaissance aircraft. The twin NFZ arrangement left a large central area in which the Iraqi air force could train, and because Saddam still exercised significant control over the areas beneath the NFZs he could continue to persecute the Kurds and Shi’as using land forces. Later, the NFZs were part of a strategy to contain Saddam, they became the field on which the international community and Saddam skirmished for more than a decade and they allowed coalition forces to conduct coercive air strikes with less risk. One should therefore be careful drawing parallels between Iraq and Libya, where a different situation exists.
The Art Of The Possible
As well as contextual issues there are realistic constraints on the implementation and benefits of a NFZ in Libya. At over 1.7 million sq. km Libya is about 33 times the size of Bosnia and is bordered by six nations with largely limited infrastructures. A similar sized area around Bosnia encompasses western and central Europe, a region replete with the infrastructure necessary to mount a major air policing operation. North Africa is simply unable to provide the level of basing support enjoyed by NATO air forces during the air campaign over Bosnia. Furthermore, whilst airfields in Cyprus, Italy, Greece, Turkey and possibly southern France might have realistic utility supporting a NFZ over Libya, bases in other European states which were used during the air campaign over Bosnia are too far from Libya to be of practical value in mounting a persistent NFZ.
To indicate the size of a comprehensive air campaign, Operation DENY FLIGHT involved an armada of approximately 200 aircraft. Although it is extremely unlikely the current crisis in Libya would ever demand a similar commitment of forces, and limiting a NFZ to areas under Gaddafi’s control would significantly ease the logistic, operational and tactical difficulties to be overcome, the substantial air effort required to conduct a NFZ between 1-3 hours flying time from mounting bases is largely unrecognized and should not be discounted, especially if the NFZ was seriously contested.
Finally, if Gaddafi relied on helicopter gunships to attack his people a NFZ might be of variable utility. Helicopters are not restricted to operating from paved airfields, when airborne they can be more difficult to detect than fighter aircraft, their ability to land almost anywhere creates additional NFZ difficulties and, unlike fast-jets, they can be readily confused with civilian air traffic (e.g. humanitarian helicopter flights). Stopping helicopters from repeatedly breaching a NFZ is therefore difficult and it must be recognized that it may not be possible to prevent all bombing, rocketing or strafing of the Libyan people by use of a NFZ alone.
Conclusion
It is obviously easier to talk about establishing a NFZ over Libya than it is to implement one. Yet before grappling with the logistic, operational and tactical realities of imposing a NFZ over even a part of Libya, decision-takers in western governments must be sure that a NFZ is the best way to achieve the required effect within Libya. Once they have decided on the purpose of a zone they must ensure it has the right mandate and ROE to be effective. Crucially, imposing a NFZ should be seen as a coercive step that may demand escalation. Whilst previous experience in Iraq and Bosnia is not irrelevant to Libya, the importance of contextual differences and the specific difficulties associated with a NFZ for Libya should not be neglected. Ultimately, the success of a NFZ is proportional to the degree it is contested, and how it is subsequently enforced. In Gaddafi’s case it may be difficult to gauge his likely reaction to a NFZ, or what unintended consequences might ensue. One certainty is that when dealing with such an unpredictable foe it is wise not to rush into an erroneous course of action. Western governments must therefore resist calls for a NFZ over Libya until it is clearly and convincingly the correct path to take.
The author, Paul Smyth was a Royal Air Force Tornado navigator and participated in NFZ operations over Iraq. He is currently owner of R3I Consulting. http://www.r3iconsulting.com/
Now that western states have recovered most of their citizens from Libya calls for a military response to the Libyan crisis have grown. In particular increasing voices have talked of the establishment of a No Fly Zone (NFZ), principally because such zones have been previously employed over Iraq and Bosnia. However, it is important to explain why such a course of action must not be rushed into. Indeed, a NFZ over Libya may be unnecessary and should probably be avoided.
Achieving The Desired Effect
The logic for mounting a NFZ over Libya is that it would prevent Gaddafi using aircraft and helicopters to suppress the popular opposition to his regime. However, the incidence of such attacks appears small, and with reports of Libyan pilots either defecting to Malta or abandoning their aircraft to avoid attacking Libyan targets, and some air bases falling within areas now beyond government control, Gaddafi’s use of air assets appears somewhat constrained. The actual danger posed by Gaddafi’s bombers and helicopter gunships therefore might not necessitate a NFZ. For example, if aircraft are only flying from one airfield and at very low sortie rates (perhaps only two flights a day) other measures such as an international threat to indict Libyan pilots or the closure of the runway may achieve the desired effect without resort to a NFZ. In addition, establishing an effective and enduring NFZ takes time (weeks not days) and other means may achieve the same effect more quickly. Indeed, if Gaddafi’s support base unravels his dictatorship may collapse before the diplomatic process and military preparations necessary to mount a NFZ could be completed.
Having The Right Mandate
To achieve the desired effect a NFZ must have a mandate that facilitates enforcement and detected breaches of the NFZ must be dealt with in a timely manner. The process authorizing enforcement must be responsive and efficient with Rules of Engagement (ROE) that allow for swift action. A NFZ without a robust mandate and timely force is open to challenge. If Gaddafi’s aircraft were able to breach the NFZ without consequence the NFZ would become a liability, reinforcing his position. With or without the umbrella of a United Nations (UN) Resolution the nations imposing a NFZ should agree a common mandate which they will uphold to avoid the situation where aircraft policing the zone enforce it to varying degrees. Should a UN Security Council Resolution be pursued then a resolution based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter which authorizes ‘all means‘ should be sought. Without the right mandate a NFZ would lack teeth, and policy value.
Understanding Coercion
Before embarking on a policy to impose a NFZ over Libya the international community must understand that enforcing a NFZ is a coercive mission. As such it must only be undertaken if participating nations are prepared to become more fully engaged in Libya. The readiness to accept escalation is an imperative because a NFZ may be challenged. Thus, if Libyan air defence radars or surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) were used against aircraft policing the NFZ, to enforce the zone aircrews would expect to take self-defence measures. Subsequent attacks against Libyan military air defence targets would be an obvious escalation of the crisis.
Although Gaddafi’s opponents might welcome such air attacks, given the history of his regime it is difficult to predict the unintentional consequences of such an upturn in violence. Whilst any bombing raid against regime assets might ignite an unpredictable response, the size and enduring nature of a NFZ would demand a greater kinetic (Offensive Counter-Air (OCA)) effort than that needed for a single or occasional strike against, for example, a runway. An OCA capability is necessary to protect aircraft policing the NFZ and it is complicated by the existence of mobile SAM systems, which are more difficult to target than static SAMs. Fundamentally, if a low level of coercion does not achieve its objective an increase in coercion is necessary to avoid failure. Consequently, before deciding on a NFZ policy for Libya foreign governments should judge whether Gaddafi would submit to one and consider what additional measures would be employed if he did not.
Similarly, it is extremely difficult to enforce a NFZ against helicopters, especially when civilian helicopters are also operating in the NFZ area. Were the international community to establish a NFZ in Libya and it did not prevent Gaddafi from attacking his people with helicopter gunships nations would find themselves in a dilemma: accept the inherent loss of face when the NFZ is inadequate or take more aggressive steps to prevent helicopter activity (i.e. kinetic attacks on ground targets). Neither option would be attractive, so the commitment needed to deal with such matters must be understood and acquiesced before a NFZ strategy is embarked upon.
A Different Context
Linking the perceived success of the mid-1990s NFZ over Bosnia to today’s crisis in Libya is unhelpful. For a number of reasons the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air campaign over Bosnia (Operation DENY FLIGHT) is not a useful model for Libya. First, there are crucial contextual differences between Bosnia and Libya that undermine the adoption of a common ‘solution’ to both crises, and second, the task of enforcing a NFZ over Libya would be more difficult than it may casually appear.
An obvious contextual difference is the prevailing geo-security environment. When NATO embarked on Op DENY FLIGHT it was able to focus almost exclusively on the Balkan crisis. This emphasis included the substantial deployment of troops to Bosnia, adding purpose to the NATO air campaign which provided protection and support to those land forces. Today, NATO’s principal focus is on Afghanistan and an air campaign over Libya would have to compete with the immense priority afforded this ongoing conflict where efforts are necessary to secure gains that were made in 2010. Neither is it likely there is any appetite amongst NATO nations to deploy troops into Libya when the alliance is so heavily engaged in Afghanistan and the Iraq insurgency still casts a shadow over the region. The strategic context that facilitated the Bosnian NFZ does not exist today. In the immediate post-Cold War period NATO may have looked favourably on an opportunity to demonstrate its continued utility but today there is little enthusiasm to place additional operational demands upon existing obligations.
There are also differences between Libya today and Iraq between 1991-2003, where two NFZs were imposed in the north and south of the country. These were established after the 1991 Gulf War when coalition aircraft were being used to monitor Saddam’s persecution of Kurdish and Shi’a minorities. The NFZs protected coalition activity from Iraqi interference; their actual ability to prevent Iraqi air attacks on civilians was limited as they were not continuously patrolled and many of the coalition aircraft policing them were ground attack and reconnaissance aircraft. The twin NFZ arrangement left a large central area in which the Iraqi air force could train, and because Saddam still exercised significant control over the areas beneath the NFZs he could continue to persecute the Kurds and Shi’as using land forces. Later, the NFZs were part of a strategy to contain Saddam, they became the field on which the international community and Saddam skirmished for more than a decade and they allowed coalition forces to conduct coercive air strikes with less risk. One should therefore be careful drawing parallels between Iraq and Libya, where a different situation exists.
The Art Of The Possible
As well as contextual issues there are realistic constraints on the implementation and benefits of a NFZ in Libya. At over 1.7 million sq. km Libya is about 33 times the size of Bosnia and is bordered by six nations with largely limited infrastructures. A similar sized area around Bosnia encompasses western and central Europe, a region replete with the infrastructure necessary to mount a major air policing operation. North Africa is simply unable to provide the level of basing support enjoyed by NATO air forces during the air campaign over Bosnia. Furthermore, whilst airfields in Cyprus, Italy, Greece, Turkey and possibly southern France might have realistic utility supporting a NFZ over Libya, bases in other European states which were used during the air campaign over Bosnia are too far from Libya to be of practical value in mounting a persistent NFZ.
To indicate the size of a comprehensive air campaign, Operation DENY FLIGHT involved an armada of approximately 200 aircraft. Although it is extremely unlikely the current crisis in Libya would ever demand a similar commitment of forces, and limiting a NFZ to areas under Gaddafi’s control would significantly ease the logistic, operational and tactical difficulties to be overcome, the substantial air effort required to conduct a NFZ between 1-3 hours flying time from mounting bases is largely unrecognized and should not be discounted, especially if the NFZ was seriously contested.
Finally, if Gaddafi relied on helicopter gunships to attack his people a NFZ might be of variable utility. Helicopters are not restricted to operating from paved airfields, when airborne they can be more difficult to detect than fighter aircraft, their ability to land almost anywhere creates additional NFZ difficulties and, unlike fast-jets, they can be readily confused with civilian air traffic (e.g. humanitarian helicopter flights). Stopping helicopters from repeatedly breaching a NFZ is therefore difficult and it must be recognized that it may not be possible to prevent all bombing, rocketing or strafing of the Libyan people by use of a NFZ alone.
Conclusion
It is obviously easier to talk about establishing a NFZ over Libya than it is to implement one. Yet before grappling with the logistic, operational and tactical realities of imposing a NFZ over even a part of Libya, decision-takers in western governments must be sure that a NFZ is the best way to achieve the required effect within Libya. Once they have decided on the purpose of a zone they must ensure it has the right mandate and ROE to be effective. Crucially, imposing a NFZ should be seen as a coercive step that may demand escalation. Whilst previous experience in Iraq and Bosnia is not irrelevant to Libya, the importance of contextual differences and the specific difficulties associated with a NFZ for Libya should not be neglected. Ultimately, the success of a NFZ is proportional to the degree it is contested, and how it is subsequently enforced. In Gaddafi’s case it may be difficult to gauge his likely reaction to a NFZ, or what unintended consequences might ensue. One certainty is that when dealing with such an unpredictable foe it is wise not to rush into an erroneous course of action. Western governments must therefore resist calls for a NFZ over Libya until it is clearly and convincingly the correct path to take.
The author, Paul Smyth was a Royal Air Force Tornado navigator and participated in NFZ operations over Iraq. He is currently owner of R3I Consulting. http://www.r3iconsulting.com/
Friday, 25 February 2011
Counter-terrorism Campaign Launched In London
Metropolitan Police Service has launched a new counter-terrorism publicity campaign. The campaign, launched February 21, is a four-week initiative consisting of two 40-second radio adverts and three press adverts, which will feature on radio stations and in newspapers across London.
The public are being encouraged to contact the confidential Anti-terrorist Hotline on 0800 789 321 if they see any activity or behaviour they think is suspicious.
The radio adverts recognise that some people may be reluctant to report suspicious activity or behaviour, such as a person taking an unusual interest in security arrangements, because it may be difficult to ascertain the seriousness of the activity. The advert encourages the public to pose the question 'What if it is serious?'
The press adverts focus on the fact that terrorists preparing attacks live in our communities and can leave signs, which the public are encouraged to look out for.
Assistant Commissioner John Yates, head of MPS Specialist Operations, said: “We know from recent significant events that the threat from terrorism is very real so we need the public to be vigilant. There continues to be a multi-faceted threat from groups ranging from Al-Qaeda inspired groups, Irish-related terrorism and right wing extremists.
“This campaign is asking the public to consider whether there is anything suspicious or unusual about the things they see every day and designed to raise awareness of the types of behaviour that we have seen among terrorists preparing attacks while living in our communities.
"I completely understand that some people may have concerns about contacting police with their suspicions, but let me reassure them that all information received by the confidential Anti-Terrorist Hotline is thoroughly analysed and researched by experienced officers before, and if, any police action is taken."
Aprodex News
The public are being encouraged to contact the confidential Anti-terrorist Hotline on 0800 789 321 if they see any activity or behaviour they think is suspicious.
The radio adverts recognise that some people may be reluctant to report suspicious activity or behaviour, such as a person taking an unusual interest in security arrangements, because it may be difficult to ascertain the seriousness of the activity. The advert encourages the public to pose the question 'What if it is serious?'
The press adverts focus on the fact that terrorists preparing attacks live in our communities and can leave signs, which the public are encouraged to look out for.
Assistant Commissioner John Yates, head of MPS Specialist Operations, said: “We know from recent significant events that the threat from terrorism is very real so we need the public to be vigilant. There continues to be a multi-faceted threat from groups ranging from Al-Qaeda inspired groups, Irish-related terrorism and right wing extremists.
“This campaign is asking the public to consider whether there is anything suspicious or unusual about the things they see every day and designed to raise awareness of the types of behaviour that we have seen among terrorists preparing attacks while living in our communities.
"I completely understand that some people may have concerns about contacting police with their suspicions, but let me reassure them that all information received by the confidential Anti-Terrorist Hotline is thoroughly analysed and researched by experienced officers before, and if, any police action is taken."
Aprodex News
Wednesday, 23 February 2011
Elbit’s Presence In Latin America On The Increase
By Adam Dempsey
Israel’s Elbit Systems Ltd (Elbit) ended 2010 with the purchase of two Brazilian defence companies. In a combined deal worth ‘tens of millions of Reals’, Elbit has acquired Ares Aeroespecial e Defesa S.A. ("Ares") and Periscopio Equipamentos Optronicos S.A. ("Periscopio"). Both companies provide defence electronic products to the Brazilian military. The investment is expected to bolster Elbit’s position in Latin America’s defence market and provide opportunities for regional expansion. The acquisitions also concluded a busy 2010 for Elbit throughout South America, both for its subsidiary and regional partnerships.
Elbit’s first major transaction of 2010 occurred in June with the announcement of a $130 million contract award to supply Command, Control, Computers and Communications (C4I) and Electronic Warfare (EW) systems to an undisclosed Latin American army. As part of a major modernisation programme covering all echelons of the army, Elbit will be contributing to the development of a unified communications network that aims to improve overall situational awareness. Yet whilst the identity of the army in question remains undisclosed, Elbit were more vocal about their bid to supply Chile’s Air Force with its Hermes 450 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV).
The contract win builds upon several years of solid, if unspectacular, success for Elbit throughout the Americas. In September 2008, for example, the company won a $25 million contract to supply a further undisclosed country with its Hermes and Skylark I UAV systems. This was swiftly followed by a $50 million contract to provide military communications systems to another undisclosed South American military. Elbit’s Annual Report for 2009 also highlights the company’s success in gaining contracts from again undisclosed Latin American countries for tactical radio systems.
Yet it is in Brazil that Elbit continues to consolidate its foothold in the Latin American defence marketplace. Elbit began a busy December 2010 with the selection of its Hermes 450 by the Brazilian Air Force to fulfil its operational requirements for two UAVs and a ground control station. The contract was formally signed on the 19th January. Elbit have also recently announced a $260 million contract to supply the Brazilian Army with UT30 BR 30 mm unmanned turrets for its Iveco 6x6 Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC).
The UT30 BR turrets and Hermes UAVs will be supplied by Elbit’s Brazilian subsidiary, Aeroeletronica Ltda (AEL). Elbit acquired AEL in 2001, placing them at the helm of a company with over two decades of experience of providing Brazil’s defence and civilian sectors with electronic products and support. Since the acquisition Elbit/AEL has been responsible for the maintenance of avionics equipment for the Tucano T-27 trainer. In 2008 Embraer awarded Elbit/AEL a $67 million contract for an avionics upgrade for the AMX A1 jet fighter. More recently, AEL has provided Embraer with multifunctional displays and communications and navigation equipment for its EMB-110 Bandierante transport aircraft. These products were tested in December 2010 when the Brazilian Air Force performed its first flight with the EMB-110.
Whilst Elbit/AEL has achieved some notable contract awards, its partnership with Embraer has been integral to the company’s success within Latin America. In 2006, for example, Embraer awarded Elbit a $17 million contract to provide avionic systems for Colombia’s Super Tucano aircraft. The contract mirrored Elbit’s provision of avionics packages and logistics for Brazil’s fleet of Super Tucano. Yet neither Embraer nor Elbit have been available for comment regarding the impact of the Israeli company’s purchases upon their commercial relationship.
As Western governments in particular have now begun to substantially reduce expenditure, 2010 became the year in which the defence sector inevitably felt the impact of austerity measures. Traditionally, the United States and Europe have accounted for between 50-60% of Elbit’s annual sales revenue. Yet with the United States seeking to reduce defence expenditure by 14% by 2014, Elbit will need to look beyond geographical regions that traditionally account for most of the company’s income.
By contrast, geopolitical tensions are driving up defence expenditure around the Asia Pacific and Middle East regions. According to SIPRI, defence expenditure amongst Middle Eastern states is closing in on the $100 billion threshold. When defence expenditure is measured as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product, spending in the Middle East is greater than anywhere else in the world. Yet beyond Turkey, the Middle East is a closed marketplace for Israeli defence industries. Elbit’s principal Latin American partner does not share the same problem. In 1989, for example, Embraer sold Tucanos to Iran. More recently Embraer has located service centres for its executive jets in Abu Dhabi. Accordingly, as Embraer seeks to increase revenues from defence projects, Brazil’s traditionally close relations with the Middle East makes this region an ideal market.
As the Middle East will undoubtedly remain off limits to Israeli defence industries, South America will gain in importance to Elbit’s business activities. Like the Middle East, South America has consistently increased its defence expenditure in recent years. In 2009, military expenditures approached $52 billion, more than twice the 1990 figure. Tensions between Colombia and Venezuela also made the continent a lucrative marketplace for defence industries. Whilst Venezuela primarily looked towards Russia for the rearmament of its land forces, one of Colombia’s key projects involved the expansion and upgrading of its Israeli Aerospace Industries Kfir fighter-bombers.
Joseph Ackerman, the President of Elbit is confident that the recently-signed contract for the Hermes UAVs will lead to further cooperation between AEL and its Brazilian customers. Elbit’s acquisition of two smaller Brazilian defence companies will undoubtedly reinforce confidence that the company is a major actor within Brazil’s defence sector. Yet the acquisitions demonstrate that Elbit remains a serious competitor for a larger stake within the global defence market in its own right. Despite its close commercial partnership with Elbit, Embraer continues to pursue business opportunities within markets that will remain closed to Israeli industries. As only South America will provide Elbit with an opportunity to offset its loss of revenue from more established markets, it seems plausible that its regional expansion will continue apace. To date, cooperation has been the keyword underscoring Elbit’s relationship with Embraer. In 2011 cooperation may well change to competition.
See Adam's Profile
Israel’s Elbit Systems Ltd (Elbit) ended 2010 with the purchase of two Brazilian defence companies. In a combined deal worth ‘tens of millions of Reals’, Elbit has acquired Ares Aeroespecial e Defesa S.A. ("Ares") and Periscopio Equipamentos Optronicos S.A. ("Periscopio"). Both companies provide defence electronic products to the Brazilian military. The investment is expected to bolster Elbit’s position in Latin America’s defence market and provide opportunities for regional expansion. The acquisitions also concluded a busy 2010 for Elbit throughout South America, both for its subsidiary and regional partnerships.
Elbit’s first major transaction of 2010 occurred in June with the announcement of a $130 million contract award to supply Command, Control, Computers and Communications (C4I) and Electronic Warfare (EW) systems to an undisclosed Latin American army. As part of a major modernisation programme covering all echelons of the army, Elbit will be contributing to the development of a unified communications network that aims to improve overall situational awareness. Yet whilst the identity of the army in question remains undisclosed, Elbit were more vocal about their bid to supply Chile’s Air Force with its Hermes 450 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV).
The contract win builds upon several years of solid, if unspectacular, success for Elbit throughout the Americas. In September 2008, for example, the company won a $25 million contract to supply a further undisclosed country with its Hermes and Skylark I UAV systems. This was swiftly followed by a $50 million contract to provide military communications systems to another undisclosed South American military. Elbit’s Annual Report for 2009 also highlights the company’s success in gaining contracts from again undisclosed Latin American countries for tactical radio systems.
Yet it is in Brazil that Elbit continues to consolidate its foothold in the Latin American defence marketplace. Elbit began a busy December 2010 with the selection of its Hermes 450 by the Brazilian Air Force to fulfil its operational requirements for two UAVs and a ground control station. The contract was formally signed on the 19th January. Elbit have also recently announced a $260 million contract to supply the Brazilian Army with UT30 BR 30 mm unmanned turrets for its Iveco 6x6 Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC).
The UT30 BR turrets and Hermes UAVs will be supplied by Elbit’s Brazilian subsidiary, Aeroeletronica Ltda (AEL). Elbit acquired AEL in 2001, placing them at the helm of a company with over two decades of experience of providing Brazil’s defence and civilian sectors with electronic products and support. Since the acquisition Elbit/AEL has been responsible for the maintenance of avionics equipment for the Tucano T-27 trainer. In 2008 Embraer awarded Elbit/AEL a $67 million contract for an avionics upgrade for the AMX A1 jet fighter. More recently, AEL has provided Embraer with multifunctional displays and communications and navigation equipment for its EMB-110 Bandierante transport aircraft. These products were tested in December 2010 when the Brazilian Air Force performed its first flight with the EMB-110.
Whilst Elbit/AEL has achieved some notable contract awards, its partnership with Embraer has been integral to the company’s success within Latin America. In 2006, for example, Embraer awarded Elbit a $17 million contract to provide avionic systems for Colombia’s Super Tucano aircraft. The contract mirrored Elbit’s provision of avionics packages and logistics for Brazil’s fleet of Super Tucano. Yet neither Embraer nor Elbit have been available for comment regarding the impact of the Israeli company’s purchases upon their commercial relationship.
As Western governments in particular have now begun to substantially reduce expenditure, 2010 became the year in which the defence sector inevitably felt the impact of austerity measures. Traditionally, the United States and Europe have accounted for between 50-60% of Elbit’s annual sales revenue. Yet with the United States seeking to reduce defence expenditure by 14% by 2014, Elbit will need to look beyond geographical regions that traditionally account for most of the company’s income.
By contrast, geopolitical tensions are driving up defence expenditure around the Asia Pacific and Middle East regions. According to SIPRI, defence expenditure amongst Middle Eastern states is closing in on the $100 billion threshold. When defence expenditure is measured as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product, spending in the Middle East is greater than anywhere else in the world. Yet beyond Turkey, the Middle East is a closed marketplace for Israeli defence industries. Elbit’s principal Latin American partner does not share the same problem. In 1989, for example, Embraer sold Tucanos to Iran. More recently Embraer has located service centres for its executive jets in Abu Dhabi. Accordingly, as Embraer seeks to increase revenues from defence projects, Brazil’s traditionally close relations with the Middle East makes this region an ideal market.
As the Middle East will undoubtedly remain off limits to Israeli defence industries, South America will gain in importance to Elbit’s business activities. Like the Middle East, South America has consistently increased its defence expenditure in recent years. In 2009, military expenditures approached $52 billion, more than twice the 1990 figure. Tensions between Colombia and Venezuela also made the continent a lucrative marketplace for defence industries. Whilst Venezuela primarily looked towards Russia for the rearmament of its land forces, one of Colombia’s key projects involved the expansion and upgrading of its Israeli Aerospace Industries Kfir fighter-bombers.
Joseph Ackerman, the President of Elbit is confident that the recently-signed contract for the Hermes UAVs will lead to further cooperation between AEL and its Brazilian customers. Elbit’s acquisition of two smaller Brazilian defence companies will undoubtedly reinforce confidence that the company is a major actor within Brazil’s defence sector. Yet the acquisitions demonstrate that Elbit remains a serious competitor for a larger stake within the global defence market in its own right. Despite its close commercial partnership with Elbit, Embraer continues to pursue business opportunities within markets that will remain closed to Israeli industries. As only South America will provide Elbit with an opportunity to offset its loss of revenue from more established markets, it seems plausible that its regional expansion will continue apace. To date, cooperation has been the keyword underscoring Elbit’s relationship with Embraer. In 2011 cooperation may well change to competition.
See Adam's Profile
Monday, 21 February 2011
Shipping Industry Changes Stance on Armed Guards
The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), the main international trade association for shipowners, announced today that it has changed its position on the use of private armed security guards to protect merchant ships against Somali pirate attacks, including those launched from hijacked "motherships" used throughout the Indian Ocean.
ICS Chairman Spyros Polemis stated that the shipping industry required adequate protection from pirates, especially in light of the "current crisis in the Indian Ocean." Shipowners have concluded that they must either arm ships or avoid the Indian Ocean completely.
Although Mr. Polemis agreed that the eradication of piracy remained the responsibility of governments, he explained that political resistance to the use of military navies to protect trade routes has left the industry little choice but to seek protection from armed guards.
Piracy costs the global economy between U.S. $7-12 billion each year, and increasing incidents around Somalia and the Cape of Good Hope could have a detrimental effect on both the price of commodities like oil and the economies of Africa and the Middle East, increasing the strain on stability in these regions during a politically uncertain time.
ISOA Industry Insight: This press release reveals frustration from the shipping industry regarding the inadequate level of protection they have received from a high-profile international naval effort to combat piracy in the region. For many shipping companies, the additional risk and liability of having armed security on board their ships makes such a choice inappropriate; however, for those with high value or dangerous cargos, the option may be more feasible. Shipping companies that decide to utilize private security to protect their vessels and crews should ensure the companies they hire are familiar with relevant international law, that they have signed onto the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers, and, ideally, that they are members of a standards-based trade association such as ISOA.
Aprodex Comment: Interested parties and stakeholders may wish to attend the following event "Tackling Kidnap, Hostage Taking and Hijacking - 2nd Annual Conference", in London on 24th and 25th May 2011, which includes speakers addressing piracy in the Gulf of Aden.
CLICK HERE for more details and to purchase tickets.
ICS Chairman Spyros Polemis stated that the shipping industry required adequate protection from pirates, especially in light of the "current crisis in the Indian Ocean." Shipowners have concluded that they must either arm ships or avoid the Indian Ocean completely.
Although Mr. Polemis agreed that the eradication of piracy remained the responsibility of governments, he explained that political resistance to the use of military navies to protect trade routes has left the industry little choice but to seek protection from armed guards.
Piracy costs the global economy between U.S. $7-12 billion each year, and increasing incidents around Somalia and the Cape of Good Hope could have a detrimental effect on both the price of commodities like oil and the economies of Africa and the Middle East, increasing the strain on stability in these regions during a politically uncertain time.
ISOA Industry Insight: This press release reveals frustration from the shipping industry regarding the inadequate level of protection they have received from a high-profile international naval effort to combat piracy in the region. For many shipping companies, the additional risk and liability of having armed security on board their ships makes such a choice inappropriate; however, for those with high value or dangerous cargos, the option may be more feasible. Shipping companies that decide to utilize private security to protect their vessels and crews should ensure the companies they hire are familiar with relevant international law, that they have signed onto the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers, and, ideally, that they are members of a standards-based trade association such as ISOA.
Aprodex Comment: Interested parties and stakeholders may wish to attend the following event "Tackling Kidnap, Hostage Taking and Hijacking - 2nd Annual Conference", in London on 24th and 25th May 2011, which includes speakers addressing piracy in the Gulf of Aden.
CLICK HERE for more details and to purchase tickets.
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