Gangs And The New Insurgency In Latin America

By Hal Brands, World Economic Review

Throughout the developing world, the post-Cold War era has seen the emergence of increasingly powerful and violent criminal organizations, often referred to as "third-generation gangs." These groups have exploited the major international trends of the past 20 years -- including economic and financial integration, innovations in communication technology, the prevalence of weak and failed states, and a thriving global arms trade -- to seize control over a myriad of illicit commercial networks. They now use violence and corruption to undermine the governments that oppose them.

Latin America has proven particularly vulnerable to this phenomenon. The region has porous borders and numerous illegal markets, and is awash with guns -- all factors conducive to organized crime. Corruption is endemic, and state institutions are weak. Widespread poverty and social alienation ensure the gangs a steady supply of young recruits. Densely packed urban slums give them near-impenetrable havens in which to operate. Finally, the deportation of tens of thousands of gang members from the United States over the past 15 years has overwhelmed local law enforcement systems -- especially in Central America and, in particular, El Salvador and Guatemala.

As a result, Latin America is now home to some of the world's most fearsome third-generation gangs. Central American maras such as MS-13 and M-18 have tens of thousands of members spread across several countries. The First Capital Command (PCC) of Sao Paulo, with perhaps 100,000 members, dominates the slums and prisons of South America's largest city and maintains alliances with mafia groups throughout South America. In Mexico, the drug trade has given rise to groups like Los Zetas, a relatively small organization that has nonetheless carved out lucrative trafficking and distribution networks, while cultivating relations with gangs in Central America and the U.S..

Third-generation gangs in Latin America share several key characteristics. They all participate in a broad range of criminal enterprises -- among them drug trafficking, human smuggling, kidnapping, extortion, arms dealing, contract killings, and money laundering. They are well-organized, with top-level bosses overseeing multi-tiered structures that operate according to a division of labor. They are also technologically sophisticated, using Web sites for recruiting and propaganda purposes, as well as electronic surveillance to track and eliminate their rivals.

Above all, these gangs are extremely violent. They use a panoply of advanced weapons -- including rocket-propelled grenades and improvised explosive devices -- to strike with astounding brazenness and savagery. Torture, beheadings, assassinations, and even massacres of innocent civilians have become commonplace. Though often described as senseless or random, this violence, which invariably comes in response to government crackdowns on gang activity, in fact serves to intimidate the state -- and the population -- into allowing the gangs a free hand in pursuing their lucrative business dealings.

Across the region, gangs like the PCC, the maras, and the Zetas have now gone a step further, using violence to carve out geographic areas where the government is essentially powerless to intervene. In some cities, gang violence has become so intense that the authorities have effectively surrendered them to the gangs. Just as Cold War-era insurgents had their "liberated zones," the gangs now control sectors where they effectively "rule."

Along with violence, the use of corruption also plays an integral role in undermining state institutions. Latin American criminals have long used the formula of "plata o plomo" -- "money or bullets" -- to corrupt government officials. Third-generation gangs have become masters of this strategy. Confronted with the choice between an easy payout and a gruesome death, law enforcement personnel frequently opt for the former.

The effects of gang activity have been devastating for Latin America. Public security has declined precipitously, with the regional murder rate the highest in the world, and corruption is more pervasive than ever. According to the Inter-American Development Bank, the economic costs of violence in Latin America may be as much as 14 percent of gross domestic product. Confidence in democracy has declined region-wide, spurring fears that Latin America's young democracies are being hollowed out from within.

Unfortunately, there is no easy answer to the gang problem. Latin American gangs are often better-armed than the police, and the transnational nature of their activity means that no single country can address the issue alone. The gang problem is also inextricably tied to other problems -- such as poverty, corruption, and the structural weaknesses of Latin American states. As a result, the "mano dura" ("iron fist") approach of incarcerating tens of thousands of suspected gang members has not provided any lasting solution.

For an anti-gang strategy to succeed, it must enhance internal security capabilities in Latin America while also addressing the underlying issues that fuel gang activity. On the former count, the U.S. can help Latin American countries train and equip their security forces, develop intelligence-sharing procedures on returning deportees, implement effective anti-gang legislation laws, and interdict cross-border drug and weapons flows. On the latter, Washington should help formulate initiatives to combat corruption, rehabilitate young gang members, and ease the poverty and alienation that makes gang membership such an attractive option for young Latin Americans.

A number of nascent programs already point the way in this regard: judicial reform initiatives in Mexico, community policing projects and rehabilitation programs in Central America, personnel exchanges between the FBI and its Latin American counterparts, and targeted social spending in a variety of countries. None of these projects are panaceas, but they do indicate promising avenues for sustainable progress in the fight against the gangs.

Defeating third-generation gangs will require an integrated strategy that combines security assistance with social programs. Implementing such a strategy will be neither cheap nor easy, but the alternative -- a lawless region where democratic governments cannot protect their citizens -- would be far worse.

Hal Brands is a defense analyst in Washington, D.C. He is the author of "From Berlin to Baghdad: America's Search for Purpose in the Post-Cold War World," and recently received his Ph.D. in history from Yale University.